




THE RIVER RUNS DRY:  WHEN TITLE VI TRUMPS STATE 
ANTI–AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAWS
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Opponents of affirmative action are waging a national battle over race-
conscious admissions through state ballot initiatives like California’s Proposi-
tion 209, Washington’s Initiative 200, Michigan’s Proposal 2, and Ne-
braska’s Initiative 424.  To comply with these new voter-approved, anti–
affirmative action laws, public universities have eliminated their affirmative 
action policies, and this has had a negative impact on minority admissions 
rates.  At the same time, federal antidiscrimination law—Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and its implementing regulations—prohibits these universi-
ties from using selection criteria that have the effect of discriminating against 
applicants on the basis of their race.  Legal scholars have largely ignored this 
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tension between state anti–affirmative action laws and federal antidiscrimina-
tion law.  Consequently, with seemingly little regard for Title VI federal civil 
rights law, public universities have been prone to assume that “affirmative ac-
tion–less” admissions policies and plunging minority admissions are the inevi-
table outcome of compliance with state anti–affirmative action laws.  At an af-
firmative action–less university, the river runs dry—the institution virtually 
stops admitting certain racial groups and presumes that state anti–affirmative 
action laws dictate such a result.  This Article challenges this framing.  Its 
point of departure is to explain how the prominent role of the SAT in selective 
college admissions, dictated in large measure by its importance in college-
ranking and financial bond-rating systems, creates an incentive for universities 
to adopt “minority-deficiency” over “test-deficiency” explanations for racial dif-
ferences in SAT scores.  The Article then endeavors to shift the focus from the 
state law anti-“preference” constraints placed on public universities to the fed-
eral antidiscrimination constraints that Title VI imposes on the same institu-
tions.  It considers whether universities that completely abolish affirmative ac-
tion to comply with state anti–affirmative action initiatives may actually be 
breaking the law with respect to Title VI.  To demonstrate this point, this Article 
uses statistical tests for identifying Title VI disparate impact—“effect discrimi-
nation”—to analyze selective California and Washington public university 
admissions cycles after the enactment of anti–affirmative action laws.  It finds 
racial disparities in admissions to affirmative action–less universities of suffi-
cient magnitude that, if unjustified, could establish that an institution has a 
compelling interest in considering race to comply with federal antidiscrimina-
tion law.  An important conclusion flows from this analysis.  State anti–
affirmative action laws may permit the consideration of race if undertaken to 
remedy federal “racial effect discrimination.” 
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INTRODUCTION
It is simple justice that all should share in programs financed by all, and 
directed by the government of all people. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson
1
We have demonstrated for decades a steadfast resolve to admit and edu-
cate students of all races and ethnicities. . . . Our resolve has not 
changed.  But the laws under which we operate have changed. 
Robert Berdahl, University of California, Berkeley,
Chancellor, 1997–2004
2
Opponents of affirmative action are waging a national battle over 
race-conscious admissions through state ballot initiatives like Califor-
nia’s Proposition 209, Washington’s Initiative 200, Michigan’s Pro-
posal 2, and Nebraska’s Initiative 424.  To comply with these new 
voter-approved anti–affirmative action laws, public universities have 
eliminated their affirmative action policies, and this has had a nega-
tive impact on minority admissions rates.  At the same time, federal 
antidiscrimination law—Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its 
implementing regulations—prohibits these universities from using se-
lection criteria that have the effect of discriminating against applicants 
on the basis of race.  Legal scholars have largely ignored this tension 
between state anti–affirmative action laws and federal antidiscrimina-
tion law.  Consequently, with seemingly little regard for federal civil 
rights laws, public universities have been prone to assume that “af-
firmative action–less” admissions policies and plunging minority ad-
missions are the inevitable outcome of compliance with state anti–
affirmative action laws.3
1 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CLEARINGHOUSE PUBLICATION NO. 1, CIVIL 
RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL PROGRAMS: AN ANALYSIS OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 5, available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/ 
documents/cr1101968.pdf.  President Johnson’s statement regards the rationale for 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
2 Pamela Burdman, Lawsuit Against UC Berkeley Claims ‘Color-Blind’ Admissions Policy 
is Unjust, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 1999, at A13.  Berdahl made this statement on behalf of 
the University in response to the filing of a Title VI lawsuit (Rios v. Regents of the University 
of California/Castaneda v. Regents of the University of California) by rejected minority appli-
cants after the University of California system ended affirmative action in admissions. 
3 Beginning with the passage of the first state anti–affirmative action law in Cali-
fornia, public universities in states with such laws have opted to eliminate their race-
based affirmative action policies and adopt policies that explicitly prohibit the grant of 
positive admissions consideration to racial minorities.  After making this dramatic pol-
icy shift to “affirmative action–less” admissions, the affirmative action–less universities 
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Critics of affirmative action keep the focus on universities’ com-
pliance with state anti–affirmative action laws by pointing to the ad-
mission of minority students with scores on the SAT4 below the institu-
tion’s overall average SAT score as proof of illegal “under the table” 
affirmative action.5  This Article makes the point that racial disparities 
in admissions have been, on numerous occasions, large enough to 
constitute prima facie evidence that affirmative action–less institutions 
are violating federal law.  The same universities that are regularly ac-
cused of violating state anti–affirmative action laws appear to admit so 
few racial minorities that the institutions are vulnerable to the polar 
not only admit fewer overall numbers of African Americans, Latinos, and other under-
represented minorities, but the rates at which applicants from those racial groups are 
admitted have also declined significantly.  The year after California enacted its anti–
affirmative action law, admissions rates for African Americans, Latinos, and other un-
derrepresented minorities applying to the most selective universities in California be-
gan an extended freefall.  Admissions of applicants from those racial groups also de-
clined at Washington’s most selective university after that state’s Initiative 200 took 
effect.  Commentators have predicted that the elimination of affirmative action will 
have a similar negative impact on the admission of African Americans and Latinos ap-
plying to Michigan’s most selective public universities.  See, e.g., Proposal 2:  What Would 
it Mean to Public Colleges, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 29, 2006, at 15A (“The [U]niversity 
[of Michigan] estimates the combined enrollment of black, Hispanic and American 
Indian students would drop from 14% to about 4% to 6% without affirmative action.”). 
4 This Article uses “SAT” to refer to the SAT Reasoning Test, formerly named the 
SAT I:  Reasoning Test.  See College Board, Frequently Asked Questions, http:// 
www.collegeboard.com/student/testing/sat/about/sat/FAQ.html (last visited Jan. 22, 
2009).  “SAT” was originally an abbreviation for the Scholastic Aptitude Test.  Id.
5 For the case of one professor who resigned from the admissions committee due 
to suspicion that UCLA was illegally admitting more black students, see, for example, 
Heather MacDonald, How UC Is Rigging the Admissions Process, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, 
at A34 (“Officials are perverting the law in a desperate attempt to increase black en-
rollment.”); Seema Mehta, UCLA Accused of Illegal Admitting Practices, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
30, 2008, at B1; Professor Protests over Black Admissions at U.C.L.A., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 
2008, at A16.  See also JOHN MOORES, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY ADMISSIONS PROCESS FOR 2002, at 3, 183-214 (2003), available at
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/compreview/mooresreport.pdf (compil-
ing newspaper articles regarding “the apparent uneven treatment afforded some ap-
plicants”); Richard Sander, Colleges Will Just Disguise Racial Quotas, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 
2003, at B11 (arguing that academic programs are “rigging their admissions systems to 
admit underrepresented minorities . . . through the back door”).  Multivariate regres-
sion analysis has also been used to measure the extent to which an applicant’s race im-
pacts her chance of admission.  Correlations between the race of applicants, particu-
larly African Americans and Latinos, and increased likelihood of admission are used to 
support claims that universities still “prefer” certain races in admissions.  Opponents of 
affirmative action generally conclude, despite the fact that African Americans and La-
tinos are admitted at lower rates than other racial groups, that facially affirmative ac-
tion–less admissions policies are still plagued by racial bias inconsistent with the re-
quirements of state anti–affirmative action laws.
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opposite accusation—that they rely on admissions criteria like the SAT 
in a manner that unjustifiably decreases the admissions chances of 
minority applicants in violation of federal law.  As this Article explains, 
the extent to which a university is vulnerable to losing Title VI federal 
funds depends in large part upon whether an institution can rebut the 
charge that it uses the SAT in a manner that unfairly diminishes the 
admissions chances of qualified racial minorities. 
In addition to being vulnerable to simultaneous allegations of im-
properly favoring and disfavoring the former beneficiaries of affirma-
tive action, public universities in states with anti–affirmative action 
laws are under intense pressure to use admissions criteria that im-
prove their prestige ranking and financial bond rating.  Like high-
school students who need high SAT scores to gain admission to top-
ranked colleges or universities,6 colleges and universities need high 
average SAT scores to place well in college-rankings systems like U.S. 
News & World Report’s “America’s Best Colleges”7 and to be rated 
highly by bond-rating systems like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.8
Because universities with higher overall SAT score averages fare better 
in both systems,9 reducing the focus on applicant SAT scores may have 
the unwelcome consequence of lowering a top-ranked university’s 
prestige standing and financial-strength rating.  Thus, this Article con-
siders whether universities could be reluctant to decrease emphasis on 
SAT scores even if they are aware that consideration of such scores is 
not essential to assessing applicants’ future college performance. 
Many other projects that articulate perspectives on the use of race 
in higher-education admissions invoke the metaphor of the river.  The 
image of the river has been used to represent “the flow of talent—
particularly of talented black men and women—through the country’s 
system of higher education and on into the marketplace and the lar-
ger society.”10  The metaphor has also been adopted to describe racial 
6 I use the term “top-ranked” to refer to institutions ranked in the highest tier of 
the U.S. News & World Report’s list of the “Best National Universities.”  See, e.g., Best Na-
tional Universities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 1, 2008, at 76, 76-78. 
7 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:  Guardians at 
the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 144-45 (2003) (discussing the 
importance of the U.S. News & World Report college rankings). 
8 See infra Section II.A. 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CON-
SEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS, at xxi 
(1998) (detailing the long-term benefits of race-based affirmative action in higher-
education admissions). 
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minorities as a “transformative” river that challenges “structural and 
symbolic subordination.”11  In this Article, the river is the group of Af-
rican American, Latino, and other minority students who would have 
been considered eligible to attend their state’s most selective univer-
sity under the policies in place prior to the passage of state anti–
affirmative action laws.  Before the passage of state anti–affirmative ac-
tion laws, the most selective universities in California, Washington, 
and Michigan12 gave positive admissions consideration to African 
Americans, Latinos, and other “underrepresented minority”13 appli-
cants.  The elimination of affirmative action to comply with state anti–
affirmative action laws dams the river of such students.  This Article 
considers whether affirmative action–less universities are potentially 
liable under Title VI when the river runs dry. 
This Article does not take a position in the important but seem-
ingly intractable normative debate as to the propriety of admitting 
11 Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River:  A Critique of the Liberal Defense of 
Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 963 (2001) (critiquing the use of the diver-
sity rationale to defend affirmative action).  For other uses of the river metaphor in 
this context, see Richard O. Lempert et al., Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice:  
The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395 (2000); David B. Wil-
kins, Rollin’ on the River:  Race, Elite Schools, and the Equality Paradox, 25 LAW & SOC. IN-
QUIRY 527 (2000). 
12 Nebraska voters approved their state’s new anti–affirmative action law on No-
vember 4, 2008.  That state’s flagship university—the University of Nebraska at Lin-
coln—is contemplating changes to its admissions policies.  See Matthew Hansen, Af-
firmative Action:  Minority Contracts No Longer Assured, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Jan. 26, 
2009; Neb. Is Fourth State to Ban Affirmative Action, CMTY. COLLEGE TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008. 
13 This Article uses the term “underrepresented minority” as some universities 
do—to refer to members of racial groups such as African Americans, Latinos, Filipinos, 
and Native Americans that are admitted to and attend colleges and universities in sig-
nificantly lower proportions than their representation in the general and high-school 
populations.  In the 1980s, undergraduate campuses in the University of California sys-
tem began considering race as a factor in admissions to increase the admissions 
chances of applicants from these racial groups.  See BOB LAIRD, THE CASE FOR AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTION IN UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 60 (2005) (describing the University of 
California, Berkeley’s race-based affirmative action policies targeting “African Ameri-
can, Chicano, Filipino, Latino, and Native American students”).  In the mid-1980s, the 
University of California, Berkeley phased out affirmative action for Filipinos.  Id. at 66; 
see also William C. Kidder, Negative Action Versus Affirmative Action:  Asian Pacific Ameri-
cans Are Still Caught in the Crossfire, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 605, 623 n.67 (2006) (noting 
that prior to Washington Initiative 200, the University of Washington Law School con-
sidered the race of Filipino applicants as an admissions plus factor); cf. Jerry Kang, 
Negative Action Against Asian Americans:  The Internal Instability of Dworkin’s Defense of Af-
firmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) (exploring how Ronald 
Dworkin’s theory justifying affirmative action for certain minority groups can authorize 
“negative action” against Asian Americans, such as when a “university denies admission 
to an Asian American who would have been admitted had that person been White”). 
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students to elite colleges and universities based primarily on quantita-
tive variables like high-school grades and SAT scores.14  In assessing 
the legal implications of the significant declines in the rates of minor-
ity admissions since the passage of state anti–affirmative action laws, 
this Article does not address whether principles of “substantive equal-
ity” require compensation to members of subordinated groups for 
structural and societal discrimination against them.15  Likewise, this 
Article does not challenge “the fairness or rationality” of admitting 
applicants based on predictions of their freshman grade point aver-
age—the conventional approach to selective-university admissions.16
Instead, it analyzes whether large disparities in the admissions rates of 
different racial groups under affirmative action–less policies expose 
universities to liability under Title VI federal civil rights regulations 
promulgated to ensure that institutions receiving federal funding do 
not discriminate on the basis of race. 
This Article has two central conclusions.  First, it concludes that 
state anti–affirmative action laws do not prohibit race-conscious poli-
cies used for the purpose of remedying unjustified racial disparities in 
admissions.  Second, the Article establishes that whether such racial 
disparities in admissions are legally justifiable under Title VI hinges 
on a normative assessment—whether SAT scores accurately reflect the 
college performance ability of minority applicants who apply to selec-
tive public universities.  A major implication of these conclusions is 
that, although frequently accused of illegally favoring minorities using 
“under the table” affirmative action, affirmative action–less universi-
ties are admitting so few minorities that the racial disparities in admis-
sions to those institutions establishes a rebuttable legal presumption 
of a Title VI disparate impact violation. 
Additionally, this Article explains how college-ranking and bond-
rating systems may drive top-ranked public universities to rely on 
“educationally insignificant”17 differences in SAT scores in order to 
14 For an exemplary discussion, see Guinier, supra note 7, at 121, who criticizes 
“our failure as a society to grapple with the complexity and arbitrariness of our current 
normative conceptions of merit.” 
15 For examples of effective and poignant critiques of liberal theory and conven-
tional criteria for assessing merit to participate in selective higher education, see Law-
rence, supra note 11, at 948-58; Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between 
Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1473-81 (1997). 
16 Cf. Lawrence, supra note 11, at 954. 
17 Title VI regulations permit a federally funded university to use tests that have a 
racially discriminatory effect only if the institution can demonstrate that it must rely on 
the criterion to achieve a particular educational goal.  The Title VI standard mirrors 
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boost their institution’s overall SAT score average.  It then articulates 
the importance of considering whether universities that select from an 
applicant pool with highly competitive non-SAT academic creden-
tials—the strongest candidates in the state and, in some cases, the na-
tion—are vulnerable to Title VI challenges because rejected minority 
applicants may allege that such institutions rely on the SAT for its 
prestige-enhancing capacity, not its capacity to weed out unqualified 
applicants. 
The major focus of this Article is to make plain that, irrespective 
of the prestige enhancement or financial value of using any particular 
admissions criterion, universities subject to state anti–affirmative ac-
tion laws are not exempt from the requirements of Title VI and that 
prestige-driven reliance on the SAT may not be an acceptable justifica-
tion under the Title VI disparate impact standard.  Title VI requires 
that federally funded universities remedy any unjustified racial dis-
parities caused by reliance on a quantitative variable that decreases 
the admissions chances of qualified minority applicants at a higher 
rate than nonminority applicants.18  In fact, federal civil rights laws re-
quire that institutions receiving federal funds rectify unjustified ra-
cially discriminatory impact and explicitly permit the use of affirma-
tive action to do so. 
In addition, this Article queries whether race-based admissions 
policies that are adopted to remedy potential Title VI violations con-
stitute racial preferences prohibited by state anti–affirmative action 
laws.  Likewise, it considers whether a rarely explored exception to 
state anti–affirmative action laws—the “federal-funding exception”—
the Title VII standard.  As an employer charged with violating Title VII may justify the 
use of selection criteria that have a racially discriminatory effect on minority job appli-
cants by demonstrating that the use of such criteria is a “business necessity,” universi-
ties may justify reliance on admissions criteria that have a racially discriminatory effect 
by demonstrating that the use of such criteria is “educationally necessary” to assess the 
future college performance ability of student applicants.  See infra Section III.B. 
18 Universities that use a specific numerical “cut score” for quantitative variables 
like SAT score and high school-grade point average (HSGPA) may be liable for violat-
ing Title VI even if race-based affirmative action results in a “bottom line” free of ra-
cially discriminatory impact.  See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450 (1982).  Ac-
cordingly, the analysis in this Article is applicable to universities that are not bound by 
state anti–affirmative action laws and that use race-based affirmative action as part of a 
“multicomponent” admissions process that affords minority applicants the opportunity 
to compete equally with nonminority applicants.  See Id. (observing that the Court “has 
consistently focused on” selection criteria “that create a discriminatory bar to opportuni-
ties,” instead of on the “bottom line” or “the overall number of minority or female ap-
plicants” actually selected). 
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permits the remedial use of affirmative action when universities are 
faced with evidence that their affirmative action–less policies result in 
Title VI racially discriminatory effect.19  If so, even in states whose 
courts define racial preferences to include race-conscious policies 
adopted to correct a Title VI discriminatory impact, universities may 
invoke the federal-funding exception to defend the readoption of 
race-conscious admissions policies as legally permissible under their 
state’s anti–affirmative action laws.20  The major practical implication 
of this analysis is that it identifies the requisite factual and legal predi-
cate for considering race to remedy unjustified disparate impact on 
minority applicants without running afoul of state anti–affirmative ac-
tion law. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I begins by describing the 
origins of state anti–affirmative action laws and the explicit connec-
tion that advocates of such laws make between the goals of the laws 
and the antidiscrimination objectives of federal civil rights laws like 
Title VI.  It also explains the substantive legal requirements of existing 
state anti–affirmative action laws, assesses the effect that “affirmative 
action–less admissions policies”21 have on the admissions rates of Afri-
can American and Latino applicants to highly selective public univer-
sities, and highlights the fact that federal civil rights law prohibits re-
cipients of federal funds from admitting minorities at significantly 
lower rates than nonminorities without sufficient justification. 
Part II sets forth a brief history of the SAT as well as arguments for 
and against the use of the SAT to predict the college-performance 
ability of applicants.  It compares the value and effectiveness of the 
SAT as a tool for predicting an applicant’s college performance to the 
value and effectiveness of the SAT as a mechanism for enhancing a 
public university’s standing in prestige rankings and financial bond-
rating systems.  In addition, this Part explains how a university’s deci-
sion to eliminate affirmative action after the passage of a state anti–
affirmative action law can result in racial disparities in overall admis-
sions rates of sufficient magnitude to create a presumption of dis-
crimination against certain racial groups. 
19 No court has considered the important question of whether and under what 
circumstances a university may invoke the federal-funding exception to state anti–
affirmative action laws. 
20 See infra subsection IV.C.2. 
21 I use this term to refer to the policies adopted by the California, Washington, 
and Michigan public university systems after their states’ respective anti–affirmative 
action laws took effect. 
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Part III applies the evidentiary standard that federal courts would 
use to determine whether a university’s admissions policies violate Ti-
tle VI regulations under the theory that the institution’s reliance on 
an admissions criterion like the SAT has an unjustified racially dis-
criminatory impact on minority applicants.  This Part analyzes admis-
sions rates by race at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berke-
ley) and the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) since 
California Proposition 209 took effect, and at the University of Wash-
ington since Washington Initiative 200 took effect.22  The analysis of 
admissions rates includes data on applicants with high school grade 
point averages (HSGPA) of 4.0 and higher who applied to UC Berke-
ley during that institution’s first year of affirmative action–less admis-
sions.  Part III also identifies admissions cycles since the passage of 
current state anti–affirmative action laws for which racial disparities 
were of sufficient magnitude to constitute evidence of Title VI “effect 
discrimination.”  It then articulates the challenges that universities 
may have in justifying reliance on the SAT as educationally necessary.23
Part IV contrasts the “diversity rationale” for race-based affirmative 
action in higher-education admissions with the remedial rationale, 
examining whether the remedial rationale is available to universities 
in states with anti–affirmative action laws who might seek to use race-
based measures to avoid Title VI liability.  Here, the Article introduces 
an analytic framework to be used by the increasing number of state 
courts that will be called upon to interpret state anti–affirmative ac-
tion laws.  The antipreference and federal-funding exception provi-
sions of such laws may be reasonably construed by state courts to per-
mit race-based affirmative action for the purpose of eliminating racial 
discrimination.  In other words, state anti–affirmative action laws may 
be interpreted to permit universities to readopt affirmative action for 
the remedial purpose of complying with federal antidiscrimination law. 
Part V distinguishes the legal constraints that state anti–affirmative 
action laws impose on public universities from the normative assess-
ment that those institutions make regarding the capacity of the SAT to 
make significant distinctions within a pool comprised of highly quali-
fied applicants.  It concludes that state anti–affirmative action laws do 
not require universities to “normalize” admitting certain racial groups 
22 Because the fall 2008 admissions cycle will be the first complete admissions cycle 
under Michigan’s new affirmative action–less policy since Proposal 2 took effect on 
December 23, 2006, Part III does not include an analysis of Michigan admissions rates 
by race.  See infra note 53. 
23 See infra Section III.B. 
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at significantly lower rates than others.  Part V conceives state anti–
affirmative action laws much like a legal default rule to prohibit race-
based policies designed to favor minority applicants lacking the ability 
to perform well in college.  It views this new genre of laws as contem-
plating circumstances in which the remedial consideration of race 
could be legally justified.  Thus, this Part explains, instead of turning 
solely on the strictures of state anti–affirmative action law, whether ra-
cial disparities in admissions warrant the remedial consideration of 
race turns on how a university assesses the qualifications of the minor-
ity students in its applicant pool. 
I. RECKONING WITH THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Proposition 209 generally forbids [race-based] action.  But there are ex-
ceptions to the rule established by Proposition 209.  If the failure to em-
ploy [race] would result in ineligibility for a federal program with a loss 
of federal funds, . . . Proposition 209 would not preclude it. 
Connerly v. State Personnel Board
24
In very important ways, states with anti–affirmative action laws are 
a national crucible for examining the potential impact of a future Su-
preme Court ruling rejecting the diversity rationale for affirmative ac-
tion in higher-education admissions.  To date, California, Washington, 
Michigan, and Nebraska have passed laws that prohibit public univer-
sities, as well as other state entities, from discriminating or granting 
preferences on the basis of race.25  After the passage of these laws, the 
public universities in those states adopted policies prohibiting the 
consideration of race as an admissions criterion.26  The impact of af-
firmative action–less policies on minority admissions rates at those in-
stitutions has been dramatic.27  In some instances, African American 
and Latino admissions declined to pre–Civil Rights Era lows.28
Because this Article goes beyond detailing the effects that state 
anti–affirmative action laws and the end of race-based affirmative ac-
tion have had on admissions to the most selective universities, the fo-
cus of this Article is a virtually unexplored inquiry:  whether affirma-
24 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 39 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e), (h)). 
25 See infra Section I.A (detailing the political and legal campaign against state-
sponsored affirmative action). 
26 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.  Universities in Nebraska may soon fol-
low suit.  See supra note 12. 
27 See infra Section I.C.
28 See id.
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tive action–less admissions policies produce such large racial dispari-
ties that the magnitude of those disparities constitutes evidence of Ti-
tle VI discriminatory effect.  This Part examines the background, lan-
guage, and demographic impact of current state anti–affirmative 
action laws. 
A.  Genesis and Future of State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws 
State anti–affirmative action laws29 are the product of a political 
and legal campaign to end state-sponsored affirmative action.30  The 
laws are touted in ballot-initiative voter guides and campaign materials 
as a new category of “civil rights laws” modeled on Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.31  In November 1996, California became the first 
29 This Article does not include Florida’s anti–affirmative action law because of the 
numerous ways in which the Florida law’s substance and background differ from other 
state anti–affirmative action laws.  On November 9, 1999, Florida Governor Jeb Bush 
issued Executive Order No. 99-281.  Pursuant to Governor Bush’s “One Florida” plan, 
the Florida State Board of Education amended the Florida state administrative code to 
prohibit racial preferences.  See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6C-6.002(3)(c), (7) (2008).  
The Florida Administrative Code provision states the following:  “Neither State Univer-
sity System nor individual university admissions criteria shall include preferences in the 
admissions process for applicants on the basis of race, national origin or sex.”  Id. at r. 
6C-6.002(7).  Many have speculated that Governor Bush introduced the One Florida 
executive order to blunt plans by California businessman Ward Connerly to place the 
controversial, racially charged issue of affirmative action on the ballot at a time when it 
could have negatively impacted his brother’s bid for president.  See, e.g., Rick Bragg, 
Affirmative Action Ban Meets a Wall in Florida:  A Businessman’s Campaign Is Unwelcome,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1999, at A16. 
30 See LEE COKORINOS, THE ASSAULT ON DIVERSITY 31-57 (2003) (examining sev-
eral campaigns against affirmative action). 
31 See id. at 11 (noting that “the opponents of affirmative action have been able to 
deftly utilize the civil rights vocabulary”); Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE
L.J. 187, 189 (1997) (noting that Proposition 209 was “[f]ormally denominated the 
‘California Civil Rights Initiative’”).  See generally Tamar Lewin, Colleges Regroup After Vot-
ers Ban Race Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007, at A1 (detailing the campaign to place 
anti–affirmative action initiatives on many state ballots). 
 The ballot-pamphlet argument in favor of California Proposition 209 made ex-
plicit reference to “the historic Civil Rights Act” and said that the initiative was called 
the “California Civil Rights Initiative” because it “restates” the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
PETE WILSON ET AL., ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 209 (1996), available at
http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/BP/209yesarg.htm. The pro–Proposition 209 argument pro-
vided in the official state voter guide explicitly promised that the state law would not 
undermine federal antidiscrimination laws like Title VI: 
A generation ago, we did it right.  We passed civil rights laws to prohibit dis-
crimination . . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . Government must judge all people equally, without discrimination! 
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state in the nation to adopt a state anti–affirmative action law.32  Cali-
 And, remember, Proposition 209 keeps in place all federal and state protec-
tions against discrimination! 
 . . . . 
 The only honest and effective way to address inequality of opportunity is by 
making sure that all California children are provided with the tools to com-
pete in our society. 
Id.
 The Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 209 in the official Proposition 209 bal-
lot pamphlet is more explicit in its assertion that affirmative action remains permissible 
under the state anti–affirmative action law:  “Affirmative action programs that don’t 
discriminate or grant preferential treatment will be UNCHANGED. . . . It does NOTH-
ING to any existing constitutional provisions. . . . Anyone opposed to Proposition 209 
is opposed to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”  DANIEL E. LUNGREN ET AL., REBUTTAL TO AR-
GUMENT AGAINST PROPOSITION 209 (1996), available at http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/BP/ 
209norbt.htm.  Similarly, the argument in favor of Washington Initiative 200 assured 
voters that the Washington anti–affirmative action law would not impact current anti-
discrimination laws.  The ballot pamphlet for voters stated that “Initiative 200 does not 
end all affirmative action programs” and that it “prohibits only those programs that use 
race or gender to select a less qualified applicant over a more deserving applicant for a 
public job, contract or admission to a state college or university.”  JOHN CARLSON ET 
AL., ARGUMENTS FOR INITIATIVE 200 (1998), available at http:// 
www.smartvoter.org/1998nov/wa/state/meas/i200/. 
 Arguments made by the proponents of Michigan Proposal 2 also identified its cen-
tral purpose as consistent with federal civil rights laws.  See The Michigan Civil Rights 
Initiative, http://www.michigancivilrights.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2009) (“Proposal 
2 . . . [r]eflects the colorblind language of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—because equal 
treatment is the essence of civil rights.”).  Proponents of the Michigan anti–affirmative 
action law also directly linked Proposal 2 to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in their argu-
ments contained in the voter guide.  See Mich. Civil Rights Initiative Campaign, Official
Ballot Language Proposal 06-02, in LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MICHIGAN, NONPARTI-
SAN MICHIGAN VOTER GUIDE 2006, at 30, available at http://www.lwvmi.org/ 
documents/LWVGuide06.pdf (“This Initiative mirrors the landmark 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and advances civil rights by prohibiting discrimination and preferential treatment 
based on race, sex and color.”). 
32 First, University of California Board of Regents Resolution Special Policy 1 (SP-
1) and, next, Proposition 209, made voluntary affirmative action programs illegal un-
der California state law.  The University of California Board of Regents adopted Spe-
cial Policy 1 on July 20, 1995.  SP-1 provided, in part, that “[e]ffective January 1, 1997, 
the University of California shall not use race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
origin as criteria for admission to the University or to any program of study.”  The Re-
gents of the University of California, Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment:  Admissions 
(SP-1) § 2 (July 20, 1995) [hereinafter UC Regents, SP-1], available at http:// 
www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/compreview/sp1.pdf.  In 2001, the Board of Re-
gents rescinded SP-1 but affirmed that University admissions remain subject to Propo-
sition 209.  See The Regents of the University of California, Future Admissions, Em-
ployment, and Contracting Policies—Resolution Rescinding SP-1 and SP-2, RE-28 (May 
16, 2001), available at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/regents/regmeet/may01/ 
re28new.pdf. 
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fornia Proposition 209, a ballot initiative prohibiting the state from 
discriminating or granting preferences on the basis of race, is the 
model for other state anti-affirmative action laws.33  Proposition 209 
took effect in August 1997; its implementation was delayed by litiga-
tion alleging that the state law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.  In 1998, two years after the passage of 
Proposition 209, a second state anti–affirmative action law, Washing-
ton Initiative 200, was approved by Washington state voters.34  The text 
of Initiative 200 is virtually identical to the text of Proposition 209.35
After success in California and Washington, the major proponents 
of state anti–affirmative action ballot initiatives pledged to reverse the 
practical effect of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter v. 
Bollinger36 by means of an amendment to Michigan’s constitution.  In 
Grutter, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause permits universities to use race as a 
factor in admissions, so long as its use is nonnumerical and holistic.37
Michigan Proposal 2, another carbon copy of California’s initiative, 
was approved by Michigan voters in November 2006.38  Like the Cali-
fornia and Washington university systems had done, the University of 
Michigan system eliminated race-based affirmative action.39  When 
Proposal 2 took effect, the law school that the U.S. Supreme Court 
made the model for race-conscious admissions across the country be-
came an affirmative action–less institution. 
33 Proposition 209 provides that “[t]he state shall not discriminate against, or 
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis or race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, 
or public contracting.”  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).  But cf. Spann, supra note 31, at 207 
(noting several ambiguities in the language of Proposition 209). 
34 Initiative 200 took effect in December 2006, shortly after its passage in Novem-
ber 2006.  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(2) (West 2008). 
35 Compare id. § 49.60.400(1) (Initiative  200), with CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) 
(Proposition 209).  Both provisions provide that “[t]he state shall not discriminate 
against, or grant preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis of 
race . . . in the operation of public employment, public education or public contract-
ing.”
36 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
37 See id. at 343-44 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law 
School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling 
interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.”). 
38 When voters passed Nebraska Initiative 424 in November 2008, Nebraska be-
came the fourth state to adopt a state anti–affirmative action law.  Nebraska public uni-
versities are in the midst of assessing admissions policies compliance with the new state 
law. See supra note 12. 
39 See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
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The end of affirmative action in higher-education admissions in 
California, Washington, Michigan, and, possibly, Nebraska40 may be 
the tip of a large anti–affirmative action iceberg.  Buoyed by the suc-
cess of several state ballot initiatives, opponents of affirmative action 
have made the state-by-state adoption of anti–affirmative action laws a 
central component of their overall strategy to end affirmative action.  
In fact, key leaders in the strategy to end affirmative action have an-
nounced several other states identified as targets for future anti–
affirmative action ballot initiatives.41  Thus, there is good reason to be-
lieve that the number of states with anti–affirmative action laws will 
continue to increase.  It is also possible that the Supreme Court  may 
reverse its position on the constitutionality of race-based affirmative 
action undertaken by universities to increase racial diversity—the di-
versity rationale for affirmative action. 
The departure of Justice O’Connor—the author of the Grutter
opinion upholding the constitutionality of affirmative action—and 
subsequent changes in the Supreme Court’s membership suggest that 
a future decision on race-based affirmative action may reject the diver-
sity rationale, which has been the Court’s primary basis for preserving 
race-based affirmative action in higher education.  In addition, the 
Grutter decision itself may contain the seeds of its own destruction:  
Justice O’Connor’s language stating the majority’s expectation that, 
within twenty-five years, affirmative action will no longer be neces-
sary.42  Opponents of affirmative action, on and off the Court, inter-
pret this language to impose a twenty-five-year time limit on the avail-
ability of race-conscious admissions.43  If the Court were to reject the 
diversity rationale, selective public universities throughout the country 
would likely react by eliminating affirmative action, mimicking the re-
actions of selective public universities in California, Washington, and 
Michigan to the passage of state anti–affirmative action laws.  There-
fore, the possibility that affirmative action–less universities that admit 
minority applicants at significantly lower rates may be liable under Ti-
tle VI has major implications for higher-education admissions across 
the nation.
40 See infra note 52. 
41 Lewin, supra note 31 (reporting that both defenders and opponents of affirma-
tive action agree that anti–affirmative action ballot initiatives “can succeed almost any-
where”).
42 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
43 See, e.g., id. at 351 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court’s holding 
that racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.”). 
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B. The Structure of State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws 
The texts of the current state anti–affirmative action laws are very 
similar.  One of the four state ballot initiatives, Washington’s Initiative 
200, became a statute while the others, Proposition 209, Proposal 2, 
and Initiative 424 amended the California, Michigan, and Nebraska 
constitutions, respectively.44  The central provisions of all four of the 
laws are identical:  “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant 
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, 
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public em-
ployment, public education, or public contracting.”45
Interestingly and importantly, none of the laws explicitly prohibits 
“affirmative action.”  In fact, the term “affirmative action” appears no-
where in their text.  Each law prohibits racial “discrimination” and ra-
cial “preferences” without defining either term46 and each law in-
cludes a textual exception that makes the central provision inoperate 
in certain circumstances when federal funding is at stake.47  All told, 
state anti–affirmative action laws do not impose an absolute ban on 
race-conscious action.48
44 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26; Neb. Const. art. I, § 30; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2008). 
45 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(2); Neb. Const. art. I, 
§ 30(1); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(1).  Michigan’s anti–affirmative action law 
includes an additional clause with repetitive language explicitly directed at the state’s 
public colleges and universities:  “The University of Michigan, Michigan State Univer-
sity, Wayne State University, and any other public college or university, community col-
lege, or school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment 
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin 
in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”  
MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26(1). 
46 Race-based affirmative action is arguably permissible under these provisions so 
long as it does not constitute “discrimination” or “preferential treatment.”  See MICH.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N, “ONE MICHIGAN” AT THE CROSSROADS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
IMPACT OF PROPOSAL 06-02, at 16-17 (2007) (interpreting Proposal 2 to allow some 
forms of affirmative action programs); Cheryl I. Harris, What the Supreme Court Did Not 
Hear in Grutter and Gratz, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 697, 711 (2003) (arguing that within the 
context of university admissions policies that rely on standardized tests of limited pre-
dictive ability, “taking race into account is equalizing treatment” and “a correction for 
the use of admissions criteria in which racial preferences are embedded”). 
47 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(4); Neb. Const. art. I, 
§ 30(5); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(6). 
48 In addition to the federal-funding exception, current state anti–affirmative ac-
tion laws include exceptions for certain gender classifications, CAL. CONST. art. I, 
§ 31(c); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(5); Neb. Const. art. I, § 30(3); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 49.60.400(4), as well as for existing court orders and consent decrees, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 31(d); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(9); Neb. Const. art. I, § 30(4); WASH.
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The fact that state anti–affirmative action laws neither prohibit all 
race consciousness nor place an absolute ban on racial preferences is 
made explicit by the presence of the language that this Article refers 
to as the “federal-funding exception.”  According to the federal-
funding exception, anti–affirmative action laws “do[] not prohibit ac-
tion that must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any fed-
eral program, if ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to 
the state.”49  A few government entities, including the City and County 
of San Francisco, have attempted to employ this exception to defend 
their continued use of affirmative action policies.50  The federal-
funding exception, however, has never been invoked by a public col-
lege or university.51  Instead of invoking the exception, selective insti-
tutions subject to anti–affirmative action laws have simply ceased con-
sidering race in admissions.  Thus, state anti–affirmative action laws 
have had a dramatic impact on the racial demographics of the most 
selective public institutions in states with such laws without the inclu-
sion of  an explicit textual prohibition against “affirmative action.” 
C. Racial Impact on Selective Admissions 
In response to the passage of their states’ anti–affirmative action 
laws, state university systems typically transform themselves from insti-
tutions that use race-conscious admissions policies into what this Arti-
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(5).  All three state anti–affirmative action laws also ex-
pressly acknowledge the supremacy of federal law.  Each contains a provision stating 
that if the law conflicts with federal law, the section shall be implemented “to the 
maximum extent” permissible by federal law and the United States Constitution.  CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 31(h); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(7); Neb. Const. art. I, § 30(8); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(9). 
49 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(4); Neb. Const. art. I, § 30(5); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.400(6).  The California law is worded slightly differently but without any sub-
stantive distinction:  “Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action 
which must be taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, where 
ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the state.” CAL. CONST. art. I, 
§ 31(e). 
50 See, e.g., C & C Constr., Inc. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 
730 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the Sacramento Municipal Utility District’s affirma-
tive action program did not qualify for the federal-funding exception and was thus un-
constitutional). 
51 The Michigan Civil Rights Commission has identified the federal-funding ex-
ception as a potential means of justifying the use of affirmative action after the passage 
of Proposal 2 in the employment context but it has made no mention of the excep-
tion’s applicability to higher-education admissions. See MICH. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N,
supra note 46, at 27-29. 
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cle terms affirmative action–less institutions.52  Because the University 
of Michigan’s post–Proposal 2 decision to end its affirmative action 
policies and the passage of Nebraska’s Initiative 424 took place more 
recently, this Article focuses on the data for affirmative action–less 
admissions cycles in California and Washington.53  The impact of the 
shift to affirmative action–less admissions at California and Washing-
ton universities can be examined based on many years of admissions 
data.  Generally, the major effect of the end of affirmative action has 
been that the most selective public universities have admitted fewer 
overall numbers of students from underrepresented racial groups.  Sig-
nificantly for determining whether institutions are complying with Ti-
tle VI federal civil rights law, affirmative action–less admissions in Cali-
fornia and Washington have also led to decreased rates of admission of 
underrepresented minority applicants.54
1.  Declining Minority Admissions and Enrollment Numbers 
Most commentary on the impact of state anti–affirmative action 
laws on public university admissions has focused on the substantial 
decline in numbers of underrepresented minority applicants admitted 
to and enrolled in the states’ most selective universities.  Clearly, this 
emphasis is warranted in light of the very large decrease in the num-
ber of students from particular racial groups admitted to the most se-
lective universities in states with anti–affirmative action laws.55
52 SP-1 eliminated race as an admissions criterion prior to the passage of Califor-
nia Proposition 209. See UC Regents, SP-1, supra note 32; Open Letter from Mary Sue 
Coleman, President, Univ. of Mich., & Teresa A. Sullivan, Provost & Executive Vice 
President for Academic Affairs, Univ. of Mich., to the Univ. of Mich. Campus Cmty., 
Proposal 2 Next Steps (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.umich.edu/pres/ 
speeches/070110prop2.html (announcing the University of Michigan’s decision to 
stop considering race when selecting applicants); see also Zachary Gorchow, California, 
Washington Give Clues to Impact of Proposal 2, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 29, 2006, at 2B. 
53 Proposal 2 took effect on December 23, 2006.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit lifted a stay granted by the district court to the University of Michi-
gan, Michigan State University, and Wayne State University that would have permitted 
the institutions to delay compliance with the new law until mid-2007.  See Coal. to De-
fend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 240 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Audrey 
Williams June & Peter Schmidt, Court Tells Michigan Universities To Comply Immediately 
with Preference Ban, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 12, 2007, at A25. 
54 The rate of admission for a particular racial group is the number of admits 
identified within that racial category divided by the number of applicants of the same 
race.
55 The reason that the University of California’s decision to prohibit race-based 
affirmative action has had minimal impact on admissions to less selective and nonse-
lective universities in that system is likely because affirmative action is typically only 
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The most selective California institution, UC Berkeley, admitted 
fewer than half the number of African American and Latino56 students 
during the first affirmative action–less admissions cycle than that insti-
tution had admitted just one year before.  In 1998, the number of ad-
mitted African American students dropped from 545 to 236, and the 
number of Latino admits dropped from 1246 to 619.57  Like the ad-
missions numbers, enrollment numbers for African Americans and 
Latinos also declined substantially.  The number of enrolled African 
American students dropped by more than half under UC Berkeley’s 
affirmative action–less admissions policies from 252 to 122 freshmen 
in a class of over 3000 freshman students,58 and enrolled Latino stu-
dents declined from 469 to 266.59
In 1999, the first year of affirmative action–less admissions at the 
University of Washington, that institution also admitted and enrolled 
smaller numbers of African American and Latino students.60  During 
the first year of post–Initiative 200 admissions, the number of African 
American applicants admitted to the University of Washington de-
clined from 254 to 173,61 and the number of African American fresh-
utilized at highly selective institutions.  Cf. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at xxvi 
(“Within the realm of higher education, we are concerned only with academically se-
lective colleges and universities.  The main reason is that the debate surrounding race-
sensitive admissions is relevant primarily within these institutions.”). 
56 The term “Latino” in this Article refers to individuals identified as either “La-
tino” or “Chicano” by the University of California.  Accordingly, all University of Cali-
fornia data labeled “Latino” combines data reported separately by UC campuses as 
“Latino” and “Chicano.” 
57 UNIV. OF CAL. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA APPLICA-
TION, ADMISSIONS AND ENROLLMENT OF CALIFORNIA RESIDENT FRESHMEN FOR FALL 
1995 THROUGH 2004, at 1, http://www.ucop.edu/news/factsheets/Flowfrc_9504.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2009).  The trends were similar for other underrepresented racial 
minorities such as American Indians (the category used in the report), whose admis-
sions numbers also dropped by half from fifty-nine to twenty-seven students.  Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.  African American enrollment also decreased.  Id. As a result, the African 
American percentage of overall UC Berkeley freshman student enrollment decreased 
from 7.8% to 3.7% and the Latino percentage dropped from 14.6% to 8.0%.  Id.
White enrollment at Berkeley was virtually unchanged—28.3% in 1997 and 28.2% in 
1998—while Asian enrollment (combining the UC categories of “Asian American” and 
“Filipino”) increased slightly from 38.5% to 39.5%.  Id.
60 University of Washington Freshman Applications by Year, Ethnicity and Out-
come 1 (2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter University of Washington Data].  This 
data is based on the latest information available to the University of Washington Office 
of Academic Record Management as of August 7, 2008.  In this data, the term “His-
panic” is used rather than “Latino.”  Admissions and enrollment numbers for Native 
American and Pacific Islander students also declined.  Id.
61 Id.
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men enrolled declined by one-third—decreasing from 121 enrolled Af-
rican American students (in 1998) to 81 (in 1999) out of over 4000 
students.62  Likewise, between 1998 and 1999, fewer Latino applicants 
were admitted—with the number of Latino admits decreasing from 
377 (in 1998) to 312 (in 1999).63  The number of Latino students en-
rolled also declined—from 188 students to 131.64
2.  Declining Rates of Minority Admissions 
It is virtually inevitable that ending affirmative action policies de-
signed to increase the representation of “underrepresented” racial 
groups would result in the selection of a smaller number of applicants 
from those racial groups.65  Yet, Title VI operates on the assumption 
that even if racial groups are admitted in smaller numbers, fair and 
nondiscriminatory selection processes are expected to result in rela-
tively equal rates of admission for all racial groups.66  This is significant 
62 Id.  Accordingly, the African American percentage of overall freshman enroll-
ment declined from 3.0% to 1.9%.  Id.  The University of Washington increased Afri-
can American enrollment to 105 for the next admissions cycle in 2000.  This increase was 
facilitated by the institution’s decision to increase the freshman class by 902 students.  Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. That decline resulted in a decrease in the Latino percentage of overall 
freshman enrollment from 4.6% to 3.0%.  Id.
65 The Supreme Court has held that universities may consider the race of appli-
cants in order to admit a “critical mass” of students from racial groups that make up 
very small percentages of the overall applicant pool.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
335-36 (2003).  Admitting a “critical mass” of racial minorities means admitting under-
represented minorities in sufficiently “meaningful numbers” that they do not feel iso-
lated and are thereby encouraged to participate in the classroom.  See id. at 318.  The 
Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to permit (public) universities that 
have a compelling interest in “diversity” to use “narrowly tailored” race-conscious ad-
missions policies that typically operate to admit underrepresented minorities like Afri-
can Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans at higher rates than whites and some 
Asian racial groups.  See id. at 334. 
66 Comparison of admissions rates by race—essentially disparate impact analysis—
can be presented as evidence to prove violations of Title VI as well as other provisions 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 
299, 307 (1977) (“[S]tatistics can be an important source of proof in employment dis-
crimination cases, since ‘absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that non-
discriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less represen-
tative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from 
which employees are hired.’” (quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977))).  Title VI prohibits unjustified racial 
disparities resulting from race-based affirmative action policies designed to remedy 
past or current racial discrimination.  See infra Section III.A.  Based on the assumption 
that all racial groups should have a fair opportunity to participate in federally funded 
programs, the fact that a university admits members of one racial group at lower rates 
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because certain racial minorities were not only admitted to and en-
rolled at UC Berkeley in smaller overall numbers under affirmative ac-
tion–less policies, but African Americans and Latinos were among un-
derrepresented racial groups that were admitted to UC Berkeley at 
substantially lower rates than other racial groups.67
During UC Berkeley’s first post–Proposition 209 admissions cycle 
(1998), white and non-Filipino Asian American applicants were admit-
ted at rates of 33.2% and 31.8%, respectively.68  In contrast, the Afri-
can American admissions rate of 20.3% and the Latino admissions rate
of 20.8% were significantly lower.69  The magnitude of the post–
Proposition 209 racial disparity in admissions rates was so great that 
African American, Latino, and Filipino students who were denied ad-
mission to UC Berkeley in 1998 sued the institution for violating Title 
VI.70
than other races constitutes prima facie proof that the institution’s selection criteria 
discriminate on the basis of race.  Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08. 
67 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
68 Rates of admission for UC campuses were calculated by the author based on 
admissions and enrollment data made publicly available by the UC Office of the Presi-
dent. See UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 57, at 1. 
69 Some Asian American racial groups were admitted at lower rates than African 
Americans and Latinos.  For instance, the comparable Filipino admissions rate was 
19.4%.  Id. Filipino Americans were considered officially underrepresented in the 
University of California system and Pacific Islanders are considered underrepresented 
minorities within the University of Washington system.  See, e.g., LAIRD, supra note 13, 
at 61 (describing Filipinos as an underrepresented group at Berkeley). It is also worth 
noting that the increases in admissions of whites and some Asian American racial 
groups do not translate into large increases in white and Asian enrollment relative to 
the size of the white and Asian applicant pool.  Because African Americans and Latinos 
are a very small numerical minority as compared to Whites and Asians in the typical 
college applicant pool, ending affirmative action increases the admissions chances of 
whites and Asians only marginally.  See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy:  Bakke and 
the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1046-48 (2002) (con-
cluding that racial preferences do not harm nonminorities as a group in the same 
proportion that they benefit minorities).
70 See Complaint at 3, Rios v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 99-0525 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 2, 1999), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/u_berkley/ 
Castenada_v._UC_Regents.pdf, settled sub nom. Castaneda v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2003).  For information on the settlement, see Press Release, 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Settlement Reached in Suit over Discriminatory Admis-
sions Process at UC Berkeley (June 17, 2003), http://www.naacpldf.org/ 
content.aspx?article=5.  When this case was filed in 1999, I was a staff attorney at the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and served as head counsel of the 
legal team representing the plaintiffs in this case.  This litigation has been the subject 
of substantial commentary.  See, e.g., Evelyn Nieves, Civil Rights Groups Suing Berkeley over 
Admissions Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at A9 (reporting on a press conference held 
by Rios plaintiffs and their attorneys from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
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Like UC Berkeley, the University of Washington admitted African 
American, Latino, and other underrepresented minority applicants at 
lower rates than white and certain Asian American racial groups un-
der its affirmative action–less policies.  During the University of Wash-
ington’s first year of affirmative action–less admissions, the University 
admitted African Americans (60.9% admissions rate), Latinos (72.4% 
admissions rate), Pacific Islanders (69.4% admissions rate), and Na-
tive Americans (70.2% admissions rate) at lower rates than it had 
when affirmative action policies were in place.71  In contrast, admis-
sions rates for white and non–Pacific Islander Asian American appli-
cants increased to 78.9% and 80.5%, respectively.72
As discussed further in Part III, federal courts have held that a 
federally funded university must justify admissions practices that select 
students of different races at significantly different rates.73  Statistical 
calculations of the magnitude of racial disparity in selection rates con-
stitute evidence of racial discrimination by a federally funded educa-
tional institution under the Title VI “effect” theory of discrimination.  
If, for example, instead of admitting students of all races at close to 
equal rates, a university admits African American applicants at a rate 
Fund, Inc., the Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California, the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, the Lawyers’ Committee for 
Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, and the Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund); see also Asian Law Caucus et al., Facts and Fantasies About UC 
Berkeley Admissions:  A Critical Evaluation of Regent John Moores’ Report, 2 HASTINGS RACE 
& POVERTY L.J. 53, 64-67 (2004) (discussing Castaneda’s role in changing UC Berkeley’s 
admissions policies); William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates “Built-In 
Headwinds”:  An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 131, 187 (2002) (citing Castaneda as an example of disparate impact discrimina-
tion); Lawrence, supra note 11, at 946-47 (observing that the Rios litigation “directly 
turns the upside down logic of ‘reverse discrimination’ right side up” and posits “a dif-
ferent view of what constitutes equality, a different remedy requested, and, ultimately, 
a different conception of justice”); Daria Roithmayr, Left over Rights, 22 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1113, 1127-31 (2001) (identifying the Rios/Castaneda lawsuit as “a specific exam-
ple of strategic rights in action”); Alan E. Schoenfeld, Challenging the Bounds of Educa-
tion Litigation:  Castaneda v. Regents and Daniel v. California, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L.
195, 210-15 (2004) (“[I]t is evident that Castaneda exerted extraordinary pressure on 
the higher education community and spurred them to substantive change.”); Burd-
man, supra note 2.
71 Rates of admission for the University of Washington were calculated by the au-
thor based on admissions and enrollment data provided by the University of Washing-
ton.  See supra note 60.
72 Id.  Calculation of the admissions rate for “Hawaiian Pacific Islanders” based on 
the number of such applicants who applied and were admitted shows that Pacific Is-
landers were admitted to the University of Washington at a substantially lower rate 
than “Asian Americans.”  See University of Washington Data, supra note 60. 
73 See infra Section III.C. 
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that is significantly lower than the admissions rates for white appli-
cants, Title VI discriminatory effect analysis becomes relevant.74  If ra-
cial differences in rates of admission to a particular university reach 
the magnitude that federal courts deem evidence of Title VI discrimi-
natory effect, Title VI requires that the institution be able to justify the 
use of the selection criteria that led to the racial disparity.75  If the uni-
versity cannot justify the use of a selection criterion that has a racially 
discriminatory impact—a criterion that causes admissions rates to di-
verge from racial parity—the U.S. Department of Justice may find that 
institution to be in violation of Title VI disparate impact regulations.  
The basic principle underlying the Title VI theory of effect discrimi-
nation is that individuals of all races should enjoy equal access to fed-
erally funded institutions and services.  Accordingly, federal courts 
have interpreted Title VI regulations in a manner that has the practi-
cal effect of requiring federally funded universities to justify large ra-
cial disparities.
D.  Racial Disparity in Lieu of Racial Parity in Admissions 
Title VI disparate impact theory presumes that “racial parity”—
equal admissions rates for all racial groups—would result if selection 
policies were free of race-conscious decision making and there were 
no significant disparities in the qualifications of applicants across ra-
cial groups.  Under a racial parity scenario, there would be little or no 
difference between the admissions rates for African Americans, Lati-
nos, whites, and Asian Americans because racial groups would be ad-
mitted at equal or close to equal rates.  Presumably, racial parity in 
admissions rates is the ideal to which both federal antidiscrimination 
laws like Title VI and state anti–affirmative action laws aspire.76  If the 
difference between the admissions rates of the different racial groups 
is of sufficient magnitude, it is a “racial disparity.”  The statistical dis-
parity, in and of itself, can be evidence of racial discrimination under 
the Title VI discriminatory effect theory.77
74 The standard that federal courts apply to determine whether a racial disparity in 
admissions rates is of legal significance is discussed in Section III.C. 
75 As explained in Section III.C, deviations from racial parity can be justified if 
there is a “valid necessity” to select based on criteria that result in the underrepresenta-
tion of a particular racial group. 
76 Again, state anti–affirmative action laws are modeled after Title VI. 
77 Of course, Title VI standards apply to applicants of all races.  White litigants 
frequently allege Title VI claims in federal lawsuits challenging affirmative action, as 
Barbara Grutter, Jennifer Gratz, and Allan Bakke have.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
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Since the late 1970s, the typical Title VI race-discrimination 
charges levied against top-ranked public universities have been claims 
that an institution’s affirmative action policy purposefully discrimi-
nates against white applicants on the basis of their race.78  But, in 
states with anti–affirmative action laws, disproportionate rejection of 
minority applicants should shift the focus to the Title VI threat to in-
stitutions.79  If the racial disparities in admissions rates since the pas-
sage of state anti–affirmative action laws are of sufficient magnitude, 
they establish the prima facie factual predicate necessary to prove Ti-
tle VI effect discrimination. 
Figures 1 and 2 are visual illustrations of the relative rates of ad-
missions by race before and after the passage of the anti–affirmative 
action laws in California and Washington, respectively.  The experi-
ences of California and Washington selective public universities reveal 
that instead of bringing an end to racial disparities in admissions, ra-
cial differences in admissions rate continue to be the norm after the 
passage of state anti-affirmative action laws.  80  The figures show shifts 
from higher to lower admissions rates for African American and La-
tino students after the passage of the California and Washington anti–
affirmative action laws. 
U.S. 306, 317 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 250 (2003); Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 270 (1978).  However, plaintiffs alleging “reverse dis-
crimination” do not invoke the Title VI discriminatory effect theory.  They would in-
stead argue that the explicit consideration of race as part of an affirmative action pol-
icy constitutes purposeful racial discrimination in violation of Title VI under the 
discriminatory intent theory, identical to the standard for establishing a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27.
78 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (University of Michigan Law School); Gratz, 539 
U.S. 244 (University of Michigan undergraduate); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (UC Davis 
Medical School); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 
U.S. 813 (2005) (University of Washington Law School); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001) (University of Georgia); Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated, 95 F.3d 53 (5th Cir. 1996) (University of 
Texas Law School).  These plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
79 After Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001), that threat is the possibility 
that the United States Department of Justice may, either on its own or spurred by 
charges filed by rejected minority applicants, find that a publicly funded educational 
institution is violating Title VI.  See infra Section III.A. 
80 The data points in Figure 1 are taken from the UCLA post–Proposition 209 ad-
missions cycles.  See UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 
57, at 2.  The data points in Figure 2 are taken from the University of Washington 
post–Initiative 200 admissions cycles. See University of Washington Data, supra note 60, 
at 1.  Years following the adoption of anti–affirmative action laws are labeled by how 
many affirmative action–less cycles have passed. 
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Figure 1:  California Example of Affirmative Action–Less Admissions 
Effect on Freshman Admission Rates by Race 
Figure 2:  Washington Example of Affirmative Action–Less  
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In the California example (data from UCLA), there is racial dis-
parity in favor of African American and Latino applicants prior to the 
passage of Proposition 209 and racial disparity disfavoring those same 
groups after the California anti–affirmative action law went into effect.  
When affirmative action was in effect in California, the African Ameri-
can and Latino admissions-rate lines were higher than the white and 
non-Filipino Asian American lines.  Prior to the passage of Proposition 
209 in California, the distance between the African American and La-
tino admissions lines and white and non-Filipino Asian American lines 
shows the impact of giving positive admissions consideration to minor-
ity applicants.  During the year immediately before the passage of 
Washington’s anti–affirmative action law (data from the University of 
Washington), 1998, the admissions-rate lines of African American and 
Latino applicants were higher than the admissions-rate lines of white 
and non–Pacific Islander Asian American applicants.81
In the first year without affirmative action (“Year 1” on Figures 1 
and 2), the admissions-rate lines for African Americans and Latinos 
drop in both the California and Washington examples.  Far from 
bringing equal admissions rates for all races, the end of affirmative ac-
tion in the California Proposition 209 example shows a very steep de-
cline in both African American and Latino admissions rates.  After 
both Proposition 209 and Initiative 200 took effect, the African 
American and Latino admissions-rate lines and the white and Asian 
American lines cross—replacing a racial disparity in admissions rates 
favoring African Americans and Latinos with a racial disparity favoring 
whites and Asian Americans.82  Hence, affirmative action–less admis-
sions in California and Washington appear to have resulted in racial 
81 Washington's most selective public university is less selective than the California 
example—it rejects a smaller percentage of applicants.  Two years before the end of 
affirmative action in Washington, 1997, African American (98.4% admissions rate), 
Latino (99.7% admissions rate), white (99.3% admissions rate), and non-Filipino Asian 
American (98.3% admissions rate) applicants were admitted at rates close to racial par-
ity.
82 If included in Figure 1, Filipino admissions rates would be lower than or com-
parable to African American and Latino enrollment and admissions rates and, there-
fore, substantially lower than the “Asian American” admissions, enrollments and ad-
missions rates depicted in the figures.  See UNIV. OF CAL. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
supra note 57, at 2 (listing admissions data by ethnicity for UCLA from 1995 to 2004).  
Similarly, if included in Figure 2, Pacific Islander admission, enrollment and admis-
sions rates would be lower than the “Asian American” enrollment and admissions rates 
depicted in the figures.  See University of Washington Data, supra note 60 (listing ad-
missions data by ethnicity for the University of Washington from 1998 to 2003). 
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disparity disfavoring African American and Latino applicants.83  Nei-
ther anti–affirmative action law resulted in racial parity in admissions. 
Federal statutory and constitutional law permits racial disparities if 
appropriately justified.  However, unjustified racial disparities of great 
magnitude—a large distance between the admissions-rate lines on 
Figures 1 and 2—may be offered as evidence that a university’s admis-
sions policy violates Title VI’s prohibition against the use of selection 
criteria that have an unjustified racially discriminatory effect.84  For in-
stance, were it to be shown that an admissions criterion like SAT score 
has a disproportionate negative impact on African American and La-
tino applicants but is necessary for universities to identify which appli-
cants have the college performance ability to be successful at their in-
stitutions, the gap between the admissions rates of African American 
and Latino applicants and white and Asian American applicants might 
be justified under Title VI federal antidiscrimination law.85  But, if uni-
versities rely on SAT scores more than necessary to identify which ap-
plicants will be successful at the institutions, Title VI federal antidis-
crimination law requires that the institutions either decrease reliance 
on the selection criterion that has a racially discriminatory effect or 
adopt remedial affirmative action policies to compensate for the un-
justified racial impact.86  Part II of this Article examines the role of the 
SAT as an admissions criterion at highly selective, top-ranked public 
universities.  It also explains the opposing views as to whether the 
SAT’s predictive capacity is strong enough to justify racially disparate 
impact caused by its use as an admissions criterion. 
83 Whether the magnitude of the racial disparity is sufficient to constitute evidence 
of Title VI discriminatory effect is a question of federal law.  See infra Section III.C. 
84 Selecting applicants from one racial group at less than four-fifths of the selec-
tion rate for other racial groups may be used by plaintiffs to prove both purposeful ra-
cial discrimination and racially discriminatory effect under Title VI.  See infra Section 
III.B.
85 In fact, courts have interpreted the Title VI discriminatory effect theory to per-
mit a defendant university to rebut evidence of discriminatory effect by demonstrating 
that reliance on a particular selection criterion is “educationally necessary.”  See infra
Section III.B. 
86 See infra Section IV.B. 
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II. EVALUATING THE ROLE OF THE SAT IN SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS
Many universities, faced with the problem of having to choose from 
among thousands of highly qualified applicants, have adopted practices 
that give too much weight to the SAT. 
Richard Atkinson, President, University of California, 1995–2003
87
In states with anti–affirmative action laws, the debate over the 
fairness and validity of the SAT as an admissions criterion is particu-
larly salient.  How a university evaluates the SAT’s precision as a pre-
dictor of applicants’ college performance ability is implicated in as-
sessing whether racial disparities in admissions after the elimination of 
affirmative action violate the Title VI disparate impact standard.  If a 
university’s admissions criteria—such as the SAT—are fair and valid 
mechanisms for distinguishing amongst the pool of high-school stu-
dents who apply to that institution, racial disparities in admissions are 
simply an accurate reflection of the lesser academic qualifications of 
African Americans and Latinos.  If the SAT’s predictive capacity is lim-
ited but maintaining a high institutional average SAT score is impor-
tant to the university’s prestige and status, institutions could be ac-
cused of overrelying on the SAT in admissions for a “noneducational” 
purpose.  The primary point of contention between the two contrast-
ing views is whether African American and Latino applicants are dis-
qualified from being educated at top-ranked state universities when 
their SAT scores are lower than the average SAT score of white and 
some Asian American applicants or lower than the university’s institu-
tional average SAT score.88
Under the first view, the operating assumption is that large racial 
disparities in rates of admission to an affirmative action–less university 
87 Richard C. Atkinson, President, University of California, The 2001 Robert H. 
Atwell Distinguished Lecture at the 83rd Annual Meeting of the American Council on 
Education (Feb. 18, 2001), available at http://www.ucop.edu/news/sat/speech.html.
88 Professor Lawrence explains the findings of the authors of Shape of the River as 
follows: 
[W]hile blacks as a group scored lower than whites as a group on standardized 
tests, the difference in these scores did not mean that blacks were unqualified 
for the education they received.  Bowen and Bok say that the difference in 
scores between black and white applicants to these schools is better explained 
by the fact that white applicants are spectacularly well qualified than by the as-
sumption that black applicants were not qualified.  More than 75% of the 
black applicants in the study had higher math SAT scores, and more than 73% 
had higher verbal SAT scores, than the national average of white test-takers. 
Lawrence, supra note 11, at 941 n.48 (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 18-19). 
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need no explanation because they track racial disparities in SAT 
scores.  From this position, the fact that the average SAT score of Afri-
can American and Latino high-school students is, on average, lower 
than the average score of white and Asian American students supports 
a presumption that African American and Latino applicants to top-
ranked public universities are not qualified to attend such institu-
tions.89  This presumption is so strong that the fact that the rate of 
admission of African American and Latino applicants may be much 
lower than the rate of admission for applicants of other races is rarely 
discussed by commentators who accuse institutions of granting admis-
sions preferences to minority applicants in violation of state anti–
affirmative action law.90
The contrasting view is that selective universities often use SAT 
scores in a manner of questionable practical value in assessing student 
college performance ability.91  Proponents of this position would likely 
reject the conclusion that African American and Latino high-school 
students who apply to their state’s flagship university with high grades 
but SAT scores below the institution’s average score are unqualified to 
attend the university.  Adherents to this perspective would also likely 
challenge the assumption that racial disparities in rates of admission 
to affirmative action–less universities are wholly the result of deficien-
cies in the academic qualifications of African American and Latino 
applicants.  Accordingly, the historical basis and rationales for univer-
sity reliance on the SAT as an admissions criterion are relevant to 
evaluating the state and federal legal constraints on the admissions 
policies of federally funded, public universities. 
89 STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE,
ch. 14 (Touchstone 1999) (1997). 
90 See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law 
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 408-10 (2004) (arguing that law schools either “‘race-
track’ admissions or add large boosts to black applications”); Vikram Amar & Richard 
H. Sander, A Mismatch Effect?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A25 (“[A]ffirmative ac-
tion . . . enables hundreds of minority law students to attend more elite institutions 
than their credentials alone would allow.”).  Subsumed within this analysis, there ap-
pears to be an assumption that the pool of African American applicants to these insti-
tutions is so utterly unqualified that the gap between the admissions rates for these in-
stitutions should reflect even lower rates of underrepresented minority admissions and 
even larger racial disparities in admissions rates. 
91 Such policies do eliminate potential Title VI liability for unjustified exclusion of 
minorities based on SAT scores.  Cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) 
(holding that “bottom-line” results neither preclude Title VII plaintiffs from establish-
ing a prima facie case nor provide employers with a defense to disparate impact allega-
tions). 
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A.  University Ranking and Rating Based on Institutional Average SAT Score 
In recent years, university leaders have become increasingly criti-
cal of the role of the SAT in selective higher-education admissions de-
cision making.92  In a now-famous speech in which he recommended 
the elimination of the SAT as a criterion for admission, University of 
California President Richard Atkinson expressed concern that “Amer-
ica’s overemphasis on the SAT is compromising our educational sys-
tem.”93  What Atkinson did not mention in his speech is the pressure 
that prestige rankings and financial-strength rating systems impose on 
universities to maximize their institutions’ average SAT scores.  In ad-
dition to serving as a tool for distinguishing among college applicants, 
educational-rating publications use SAT scores to compare colleges 
and universities.  The fact that an institution’s prestige ranking and 
bond rating are tied to its reliance on SAT scores means that institu-
tions concerned about their rankings and ratings have a strong incen-
tive to use SAT scores irrespective of whether the SAT has the capacity 
to identify meaningful distinctions between applicants with very strong 
non-SAT academic credentials.94
First published in 1983, the U.S. News & World Report (U.S. News)
rankings began incorporating quantitative statistical categories in 
1989.95  The relative weights of the ranking categories, including insti-
tutional average SAT score, are periodically adjusted by the publica-
tion at its discretion.96  Since their first publication, the U.S. News rank-
92 See, e.g., Jacques Steinberg, Challenge Revives SAT Test Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2001, at A14 (describing former University of California President Richard Atkinson’s 
later-revised recommendation that the University of California cease requiring the 
SAT). 
93 Atkinson, supra note 87. 
94 See Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda, Diversity, Opportunity, and the Shifting Meritocracy 
in Higher Education, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 487, 508 (2007) (concluding, based on a litera-
ture review, that a main factor leading to the increased reliance on standardized test 
scores in college admissions is “selective institutions’ attempts to climb the pecking or-
der in various college ranking systems, such as the U.S. News and World Report and Bar-
ron’s, [which tip] the weights placed on student test scores”); Guinier, supra note 7, at 
154-55 (explaining that “hard numbers” like SAT scores tend to dominate admissions 
decisions because selective colleges and universities “become committed to admitting 
mostly those students whose test scores protect the institution’s own rankings”). 
95 See Elizabeth F. Farrell & Martin Van Der Werf, Playing the Rankings Game,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 25, 2007, at A11, A14, A16 (describing the development 
of the rankings). 
96 See id. (noting that “one year’s figures should not be compared with previous 
years’ because editors ‘change the methodology every year’”).
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ings have been subject to strong criticism.97  The two most salient cri-
tiques of the system are, first, that the U.S. News ranking criteria and 
weighting of those criteria lack any empirical or theoretical basis,98
and, second, that the rankings can be manipulated by “ranksteer-
ing”—the practice of making higher-education admissions and admin-
istrative decisions in a manner designed to move higher on university 
ranking lists.99
There is strong anecdotal and empirical evidence that the real-
world impact of a university’s average SAT score on its U.S. News rank-
ing is significantly greater than the explicit formula weight reported 
by U.S. News to calculate rankings.100  Although the U.S. News rankings 
formula gives average SAT score an explicit weight of 7.5%, studies 
indicate that a university’s mean SAT score affects where institutions 
fall in the prestige rankings to a much larger degree.101  Reports of in-
stitutional success in “moving up” in the prestige rankings are often 
linked to increases in an institution’s average SAT score.102
97 See, e.g., Nicholas Thompson, Playing With Numbers:  How U.S. News Mismeasures 
Higher Education and What We Can Do About It, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 2000, at 16, 16 
(criticizing the rankings for “push[ing] schools to improve in tangential ways and 
fuel[ing] the increasingly prominent view that colleges are merely places in which to 
earn credentials”). 
98 See NAT’L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., A REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR THE 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT’S RANKINGS OF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGES AND UNIVER-
SITIES (1997), available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2000/ 
norc.html (concluding that “the weights used to combine the various measures into an 
overall rating lack any defensible empirical or theoretical basis”).  The National Opin-
ion Research Center report also notes that many studies indicate that the U.S. News 
rankings are “sensitive to relatively small changes in the weighting scheme.”  Id.; see also
Theodore P. Seto, Understanding the U.S. News Law School Rankings, 60 SMU L. REV. 493, 
508-12 (2007) (demonstrating the unreliability of U.S. News rankings of law schools). 
99 See Julie Rawe, The Rankings Revolt, TIME, Apr. 2, 2007, at 49, 50 (describing the 
“pernicious” practice of “ranksteering”). 
100 See, e.g., Thomas J. Webster, A Principal Component Analysis of the U.S. News & 
World Report Tier Rankings of Colleges and Universities, 20 ECON. EDUC. REV. 235, 243 
(2001) (“The main finding of this study is that the actual contributions of the 11 rank-
ing criteria examined differ explicitly from the explicit [U.S. News] weighting scheme 
because of the presence of severe and pervasive multicollinearity.”). 
101 See, e.g., Alon & Tienda, supra note 94, at 498 (stating that their findings about 
the weight of the test “may be an underestimation”).
102 Farrell & Van Der Werf, supra note 95, at A14, A16, report that “[o]ver the last 
five years, the average SAT score of enrolling first-year students has risen 30 points, to 
1219” at Baylor University—a university that moved up the rankings from the un-
ranked third tier to rank 81st among national universities.  Further, they noted that 
Chapman University improved its U.S. News ranking from 90th to 11th among its peer 
institutions by setting a minimum SAT score requirement of 740 and increasing the 
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Research relying on regression analyses and simulations indicate 
that selective colleges and universities have responded to increased 
internal and external emphasis on rankings and ratings by increasing 
their emphasis on SAT scores as an admissions criterion.103  This ap-
pears to be a very rational institutional reaction in light of findings 
that a university’s average SAT score has greater actual effect on an 
institution’s ranking than other higher-weighted ranking criteria be-
cause the other non-SAT criteria seem to be greatly impacted by the 
institution’s average SAT score.104  The institutional average SAT cate-
gory is likely multicollinear.  If this is true, the U.S. News rankings 
could be, in effect, double, triple, or quadruple counting institutional 
average SAT score criteria in its rankings.105  Consequently, keeping a 
close watch on how an applicant’s SAT score will impact the institu-
tion’s average SAT score—a form of ranksteering—has become com-
monplace at selective universities.106
minimum score “another 10 or 20 points” each year so that the “minimum SAT score is 
now 1050.”  Id.
103 See Alon & Tienda, supra note 94, at 498-99 (finding a temporal change in the 
weight placed on SAT scores as compared to class rank between 1982 and 1992 and 
describing the fact that “test-score weights exceed those for class rank at the more se-
lective institutions, and this gap widened substantially over time” as depicting a “shift-
ing meritocracy”). 
104 See J. Fredericks Volkwein & Kyle V. Sweitzer, Institutional Prestige and Reputation 
Among Research Universities and Liberal Arts Colleges, 47 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 129, 143 
(2006) (“Among all 447 institutions, median SAT score and compensation for full pro-
fessors, not adjusted for cost-of-living, appear as strong indicators of prestige.”); Web-
ster, supra note 100, at 243 (finding that “when the effects of multicollinearity were ex-
plicitly considered,” the institutional average SAT score ranked first as “the most 
significant ranking criterion,” while “academic reputation, which is the most heavily 
weighted [U.S. News] ranking criterion[,] . . . ranked fourth”). 
105 Webster notes that 
[t]he importance of [average SAT scores] in explaining the [U.S. News] tier 
stems not only from its direct effect on tier rankings but also from its indirect
effect on seven of the remaining ten ranking criteria, including (in descend-
ing order) actual graduation rates, predicted graduation rates, retention rates, 
alumni contributions, academic reputation, the percentage of enrolled stu-
dents who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school class, and the 
acceptance rate. 
Webster, supra note 100, at 243 (emphasis added). 
106 See Lloyd Thacker, Editor’s Stories I, in COLLEGE UNRANKED 55, 58 (Lloyd 
Thacker ed., 2005) (“The groundswell of interest in managing image by improving 
rank has also resulted in giving more weight to SAT scores when admitting students, 
since a college’s average SAT scores are given significant consideration in determining 
its rank.”). 
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Average institutional SAT scores are also used by bond-rating 
agencies to assess a university’s financial viability.  The three major fi-
nancial rating agencies—Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & 
Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings—consider average SAT scores as part of 
their credit analyses.107  Because it has become increasingly common 
for colleges and universities to issue bonds to raise money for major 
expansion projects,108 many institutions have a very direct financial in-
centive to try to increase their overall average SAT score.  The fact 
that average SAT score is used to gauge institutional financial health 
as well as prestige encourages admissions officials to place even 
greater weight on SAT scores as an admissions criterion.109
The institutional-level SAT competition has become so intense 
that educational leaders analogize the pressure on universities to in-
crease their average SAT score to the pressure on nations to increase 
their nuclear weapons capability.110  Like world leaders who recognize 
the fatal danger that nuclear armament poses for every nation in-
volved, university leaders complain that the race to increase average 
SAT scores poses an incredible danger to the future of higher educa-
tion.111  So similar is the predicament of university leaders to that of 
107 See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, PUBLIC FINANCE CRITERIA 176 (2007), available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/products/PF_Criteria_Book_2007.pdf 
(stating that standardized test scores can “enhance[] a school’s ability to withstand a 
decline in demand”); Standard & Poor’s, University of Washington; Lease; Public 
Coll/Univ—Unlimited Student Fees, RATINGSDIRECT, Apr. 15, 2008, at 2-3, available at
http://www.washington.edu/admin/treasury/pdfs/S&PReport2008GRB.pdf (assigning 
AA+ rating to the University of Washington’s general revenue refunding bonds, series 
2008, based on, among other factors, the fact that “[s]tudent quality is good, with aver-
age SAT scores for fall 2007 at 1196”); Press Release, Stevens Inst. of Tech., Stevens 
Receives “A”s from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investor’s Services with Bond Rat-
ings’ Upgrades (Aug. 12, 1998), available at http://www.stevens.edu/press/pr/ 
pr019.htm (citing Moody’s report as stating that “S.A.T. scores of 1290 indicate student 
quality is high”). 
108 See Audrey Williams June, Under the Ratings Agency’s Microscope, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Jan. 27, 2006, at  A27 (noting the increasing use of bonds “to finance the 
apartment-style residence halls, gleaming fitness centers, and academic buildings that 
have cropped up on campuses”). 
109 See Bruce J. Poch, Sanity Check, in COLLEGE UNRANKED, supra note 106, at 52. 
110 See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 87 (“In many ways, we are caught up in the educa-
tional equivalent of a nuclear arms race.  We know that this overemphasis on test 
scores hurts all involved, especially students.  But we also know that anyone or any in-
stitution opting out of the competition does so at considerable risk.”). 
111 See Rawe, supra note 99, at 49 (noting college presidents’ displeasure with the 
rankings system).  In fact, university leaders have expressed concern that the K-12 edu-
cational system is increasingly focused on skills that correlate to success on the SAT 
and other standardized tests at the expense of teaching students the critical-thinking 
2009] State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws and Title VI 1109
nations that they face a fear analogous to the fear of nations that dis-
armament will make them weak in the eyes of the world; universities 
fear that decreasing reliance on SAT scores will weaken their position 
in college-ranking systems. 
B. Debating Minority Deficiency Versus Test Deficiency 
The large declines in African American and Latino admissions to 
top-ranked public universities after the passage of anti–affirmative ac-
tion laws have reinvigorated those who criticize how universities rely 
on SAT scores.  Central to the debate over the proper role of SAT 
scores in selective admissions is whether it is appropriate or accurate 
to equate an applicant’s SAT score with her college performance abil-
ity.  According to the SAT-critical view, using the SAT as the tipping 
factor for admissions decisions is not a valid way of distinguishing be-
tween candidates at the most qualified end of the minority-applicant 
pool.  The pro-SAT view is that selective universities appropriately rely 
on SAT scores because the scores are the best means of identifying 
which applicants will succeed at top-ranked institutions.  Which of 
these views is correct is a hotly contested issue. 
It is also important to note that the persistent and pervasive racial 
gap in SAT scores raises the stakes in the debate over how much SAT 
reliance is justified.  In the midst of disagreement as to the proper 
role of the SAT as an admissions criterion, an explanation for the ra-
cial gap in SAT scores remains elusive.112  Generally, there are two ma-
jor categories of opposing theories explaining the racial gap in SAT 
scores:  “minority-deficiency” theories and “test-deficiency” theories.  
Minority-deficiency theories accept as given that the racial gap in test 
scores measures a true deficiency in minority academic preparedness.  
A prominent minority-deficiency theory posits that African Americans 
score lower on standardized tests like the SAT because they live in 
homes with fewer books and have parents less likely to have attended 
college and who are less likely to read with them on a regular basis.113
and analytical skills that they need to perform well in college and beyond.  See generally
PETER SACKS, STANDARDIZED MINDS (1999). 
112 See generally THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks & Mere-
dith Phillips eds., 1998) (collecting various essays that attempt to explain the racial gap 
in test scores). 
113 This theory can be described more specifically as a theory of African American 
“cultural deficiency.”  See Meredith Phillips et al., Family Background, Parenting Practices, 
and the Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 112, 
at 103, 107-08 (discussing the impact of environmental conditions on test results). 
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Another theory points to African American youth’s rejection of “act-
ing white” as evidence of a counteracademic culture that depresses Af-
rican American test performance.114
Test-deficiency theories, however, posit that the SAT is itself defi-
cient as an academic measurement tool, particularly in predicting the 
future success of minority applicants.115  The research of educational 
psychologist Claude Steele has led him to posit a leading test-
deficiency theory.  Steele’s increasingly significant theory contends 
that the racial gap in SAT and other standardized-test scores is the ef-
fect of the “stereotype threat” on African American test-takers—
consciousness that the gender, racial, or other demographic group to 
which one belongs is expected (stereotyped) by society to perform 
poorly in a particular milieu.116  When steps are taken to eliminate the 
threat of negative academic stereotypes about African Americans be-
fore they take a particular test, the gap between African Americans’ 
114 See, e.g., Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students’ School Success:  Cop-
ing with the “Burden of ‘Acting White,’” 18 URB. REV. 176, 176 (1986) (using ethnographic 
data to argue that “the fear of being accused of ‘acting white’ causes a social and psy-
chological situation which diminishes black students’ academic effort and thus leads to 
underachievement”).  But see James W. Ainsworth-Darnell & Douglas B. Downey, Assess-
ing the Oppositional Culture Explanation for Racial/Ethnic Differences in School Performance,
63 AM. SOC. REV. 536, 536 (1998) (rejecting Fordham & Ogbu’s oppositional culture 
theory based on analysis of the National Education Longitudinal Study’s data of Afri-
can American, Asian American, and non-Hispanic white high school sophomores). 
115 See, e.g., Kidder & Rosner, supra note 70, at 147-57 (analyzing the disparate im-
pact of the construction of SAT questions); Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air:  How 
Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 613-15 
(1997) (discussing how the stereotype threat influences the standardized-test perform-
ance of women and African Americans); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Af-
firmative Action:  Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957 (1996) (arguing 
that standardized tests are more predictive of parental socioeconomic status and “past 
opportunities” than of educational achievement). 
116 See Steele, supra note 115, at 619-24.  Steele’s theory has been tested and sup-
ported by a vast array of empirical research on the impact of stereotype threat on per-
formance.  See, e.g., Joshua Aronson et al., When White Men Can’t Do Math:  Necessary and 
Sufficient Factors in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 29, 29 (1999) 
(finding that “stereotype-threatened white males performed worse on a difficult math 
test than a nonstereotype-threatened control group”); Catherine Good et al., Problems 
in the Pipeline:  Stereotype Threat and Women’s Achievement in High-Level Math Courses, 29 J.
APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 17, 17 (2008) (proposing “that even among the 
most highly qualified and persistent women in college mathematics, stereotype threat 
suppresses test performance”); Jeff Stone et al., Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic 
Performance, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSCYHOL. 1213 (1999) (demonstrating that the 
stereotype threat can negatively impact sports performance); Nai Chi Jonathan Yeung 
& Courtney von Hippel, Stereotype Threat Increases the Likelihood that Female Drivers in a 
Simulator Run over Jaywalkers, 40 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 667 (2008). 
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and whites’ test scores closes.117  Extensive stereotype-threat research 
suggests that factors unrelated to the academic preparedness of Afri-
can American and Latino students could skew standardized test scores 
in a manner that contributes to the racial gap in SAT scores.118
Other test-deficiency theories contend that standardized tests like 
the SAT are less useful in predicting the academic success of certain 
racial groups because the SAT does not measure the counter-
discrimination and counterstereotype skills that minority students 
need to be successful in college.119  Some of these theories also main-
tain that the SAT is constructed in a manner that disadvantages racial 
minorities.  For example, trial SAT questions answered correctly by 
higher proportions of African Americans and Latinos are less likely to 
become bona fide SAT questions than questions answered correctly by 
white test-takers who have, on average, higher SAT scores.120
Identifying the cause of the racial gap in SAT scores is intercon-
nected with determining the proper level of emphasis on the SAT as 
an admissions criterion.  Absent a definitive explanation of the racial 
gap in SAT scores, the minority-deficiency and test-deficiency theories 
strongly influence the views of college applicants, universities, and 
other significant stakeholders in higher education.  If the minority-
deficiency theory is correct, maintaining or increasing current levels 
of reliance on SAT scores is in harmony with identifying applicants 
most prepared to succeed academically in college.  If the test-
deficiency theory is correct, however, decreasing reliance on SAT 
scores is consistent with, and not a deviation from, basing admissions 
decisions on applicants’ academic competence and likelihood of aca-
demic success. 
117 See Steele, supra note 115, at 614. 
118 See generally Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellec-
tual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 797 
(1995) (suggesting that the stereotype threat itself “may interfere with the intellectual 
functioning of [African American] students”). 
119 See, e.g., Jairo N. Fuertes & William E. Sedlacek, Using Non-Cognitive Variables to 
Predict the Grades and Retention of Hispanic Students, C. STUDENT AFF. J., Spring 1995, at 
30 (finding that Hispanic students’ “ability to identify and combat perceived interper-
sonal and institutional racism” was predictive of their success in college); Terence J. 
Tracey & William E. Sedlacek, A Comparison of White and Black Student Academic Success 
Using Noncognitive Variables:  A LISREL Analysis, 27 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 333, 334 (1987) 
(arguing that certain “less intellectual” traits are “highly related to academic success”). 
120 Kidder & Rosner, supra note 70, at 153 (arguing that “facially-neutral SAT test 
construction will have a strong tendency to eliminate items . . . on which African 
Americans and Chicanos outperform Whites”). 
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Prior to the passage of state anti–affirmative action laws, the na-
tion’s selective universities were permitted, under both state and fed-
eral law, to use affirmative action.  The Supreme Court has held in 
Grutter and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke that certain 
race-based affirmative action is legally permissible.121  Before state uni-
versities in California, Washington, and Michigan ended their race-
based affirmative action policies, the positive admissions consideration 
afforded to underrepresented minorities pursuant to such policies 
counterbalanced the negative impact that the racial gap in SAT scores 
would otherwise have had on African American and Latino admissions 
rates.122  But, at institutions without affirmative action, nothing coun-
terbalances the disparate impact of SAT reliance.  Therefore, it is of 
enhanced significance in states with anti–affirmative action laws 
whether the minority-deficiency theory or the test-deficiency theory 
121 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
122 This counterbalancing eliminated disparities in the racial composition of the 
applicants actually admitted.  However, even universities using race-based affirmative 
action are vulnerable to Title VI charges that the use of a particular selection criteria 
has an unjustified racially discriminatory effect on applicants, regardless of whether 
affirmative action eliminates that impact on the “bottom-line” of admissions.  See supra
note 91 and accompanying text.  Interestingly, Justice Thomas, a staunch critic of race-
based affirmative action, was the member of the Court in Grutter who most explicitly 
described the manner in which universities have traditionally used affirmative action as 
a corrective for the deficiencies in tests like the SAT: 
[N]o modern law school can claim ignorance of the poor performance of 
blacks, relatively speaking, on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT).  Nev-
ertheless, law schools continue to use the test and then attempt to “correct” 
for black underperformance by using racial discrimination in admissions so as 
to obtain their aesthetic student body. . . . The [University of Michigan] Law 
School itself admits that the test is imperfect, as it must, given that it regularly 
admits students who score at or below 150 (the national median) on the test. 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 369-70 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas refused to con-
done race-conscious admissions because the University of Michigan Law School’s need 
to use affirmative action was a “self-inflicted wound[].”  Id. at 350.  Justice Powell, how-
ever, reached a very different conclusion in Bakke regarding the legal significance of 
test deficiency.  He suggested that the need to use race as a corrective for deficiencies 
in a test’s predictive ability may constitute a compelling state interest.  See Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 306 n.43 (suggesting that racial classification could offset “some cultural bias in 
grading or testing procedures”).  Professor Tomiko Brown-Nagin has noted, “But for 
the University’s heavy reliance upon discriminatory admissions criteria as a sorting 
mechanism, the aspirations for diversity and selectivity would not be in tension.”  
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Transformative Racial Politics of Justice Thomas?:  The Grutter v. 
Bollinger Opinion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787, 800 (2005). 
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explains the racial gap in SAT scores.123  Hence, it is valuable to con-
sider how the SAT came to play such a prominent role in higher-
education admissions, the history of the SAT as an admissions crite-
rion, and the competing theories as to whether such a role is proper. 
1.  The Well-Meaning History and Intent of  
the SAT in College Admissions 
During the 1930s, the President of Harvard University, James Bry-
ant Conant, led the country in adopting the original Scholastic Apti-
tude Test (SAT) as a criterion for assessing college applicants.124  Us-
ing a standardized test to assess the intellectual capacity of college 
applicants was a radical and egalitarian concept in Conant’s day.125
Prior to the use of the SAT, college-admissions officers relied on a 
close-knit network of private and elite preparatory school headmasters 
to channel the children of America’s aristocracy into higher educa-
tion.126  Conant believed that using tests designed to measure intelli-
gence and mental aptitude was the means to realizing the “natural ar-
istocracy” advocated by Thomas Jefferson.127  Pleased that the SAT was 
very similar in format to mental-measurement tests developed by the 
French psychologist Alfred Binet,128 creator of the first modern intelli-
gence test,129 Conant decided to use the SAT to award scholarships to 
123 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 46, at 711 (arguing that, within the context of uni-
versity admissions policies that rely on standardized tests of limited predictive ability, 
“taking race into account is equalizing treatment” and “a correction for the use of ad-
missions criteria in which racial preferences are embedded”); Sturm & Guinier, supra
note 115, at 957 (claiming that standardized tests such as the SAT and the LSAT have 
limited predictive ability). 
124 See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
MERITOCRACY 38 (1999) (describing Conant’s move to give scholarships based on SAT 
scores due to his belief that the SAT measures natural intelligence); see also Guinier, 
supra note 7, at 131-33 (explaining Conant’s goal of providing elite institutions with 
merit-based selection criteria); cf. Roithmayr, supra note 15, at 1488-92 (describing the 
“racist and nativist” origins of modern standardized tests and their connection to the 
eugenics movement).  For more on Roithmayr’s claim, see JAMES CROUSE & DALE 
TRUSHEIM, THE CASE AGAINST THE SAT 21 (1988). 
125 See LEMANN, supra note 124, at 52 (describing Conant’s radical idea to provide 
merit-based access to joining the elite governing class). 
126 See, e.g., JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF ADMISSION 
AND EXCLUSION AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON 26-39 (2005) (describing the long 
history and regularity of elite private boarding schools sending graduates to Harvard, 
Princeton, and Yale). 
127 LEMANN, supra note 124, at 42-43.
128 Id. at 17. 
129 Id. at 17-18. 
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Harvard University.  For Conant, the major appeal of the SAT was that 
it could be used to select applicants based on their intellectual capac-
ity, without regard to whether they had the economic means to attend 
elite preparatory high schools.130
2.  Effectiveness of the SAT in Distinguishing  
Amongst Highly Qualified Applicants 
The SAT remains such a prominent criterion in college admis-
sions because of its unique capacity to provide a standardized yard-
stick for comparing students from high schools across the country at 
minimal monetary expense to colleges and universities.131  In recent 
years, the most esteemed colleges and universities in the country have 
seen an increase in the academic qualifications of high-school appli-
cants.132  The average SAT scores, HSGPAs, and breadth of extracur-
ricular experiences of students applying to selective colleges and uni-
versities are at all-time highs.133  So, while James Conant needed the 
SAT to help Harvard find intellectual diamonds in the rough who 
might not otherwise be discovered, today’s most selective higher-
education institutions need the SAT to help them select among a glit-
tering assortment of extremely appealing applicants. 
By combining an applicant’s SAT score with his HSGPA, universi-
ties typically create a numerical composite index score that admissions 
officers use to compare and rank applicants quantitatively.134  A major 
ostensible reason that colleges require applicants to take the SAT is 
that an applicant’s SAT score offers admissions officers information 
that assists them in predicting whether a student is likely to succeed at 
their institution.  Educational-measurement experts produce institu-
tion-specific data about the future success of high-school students by 
130 Id. at 38. 
131 See, e.g., ROBERT F. FULLINWIDER & JUDITH LICHTENBERG, LEVELING THE PLAY-
ING FIELD 119 (2004). 
132 See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 29-30 (pointing out that competition 
for admission at selective schools has increased dramatically, with SAT scores for both 
white and African American applicants continuing upward). 
133 Id.
134 The LSAT plays a similar role in law school admissions, with law schools typi-
cally placing even greater emphasis on composite scores (derived from LSAT scores 
and undergraduate grade point average) than undergraduate institutions.  See Linda F.
Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education:  An Empirical Analysis of the Conse-
quences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 2 (1997) (noting that undergraduate GPAs and LSAT scores are the criteria most 
heavily relied on in admissions decisions). 
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comparing the entering SAT scores of prior applicants with their first-
year grades during college.  Although the HSGPA of applicants are 
more predictive of college success (defined by first-year grades) than 
are SAT scores alone, many studies have found that relying on a com-
bination of SAT and HSGPA is more predictive than using HSGPA 
alone.135  Universities also use the SAT because it serves as a uniform 
measurement tool that offsets concerns about the lack of consistency 
in high-school grading criteria and the increasingly common practice 
of giving higher grades to students to increase their college-
admissions competitiveness. 
The other major argument in favor of requiring applicants to 
submit SAT scores as part of their college applications is that using 
SAT scores to evaluate students is extremely efficient.  Each year, the 
number of applicants to the nation’s most prestigious colleges and 
universities increases.136  Institutions must either increase the size of 
their admissions staffs to evaluate the larger numbers of applications 
that they receive or devise more efficient means of assessing appli-
cants.  Universities can use SAT scores to winnow the pool of qualified 
applicants even further based on the assumption that high-school 
grades should be augmented by a more objective and more standard-
ized assessment measure. 
The SAT also makes assessment of a geographically diverse appli-
cant pool more efficient because it provides a numerical score that 
can be used to compare applicants from any high school in any part of 
the country.  Since the test takers, not universities, bear the direct 
costs of the SAT testing system, requiring applicants to submit SAT 
scores as well as high-school grades saves money as compared to pay-
ing admissions officers to gather information about unfamiliar schools 
in unfamiliar geographic locales.  Moreover, unlike a student-written 
personal statement or listing of extracurricular involvement, SAT 
scores can be easily entered into and ranked by a computer at mini-
mal cost to the institution. 
135 See, e.g., Saul Geiser & Maria Veronica Santelices, Validity of High School Grades in 
Predicting Student Success Beyond the Freshman Year:  High School Record vs. Standardized 
Tests as Indicators of Four-Year College Outcomes (Ctr. for Studies in Higher Educ., Univ. of 
Cal., Berkeley, Research & Occasional Paper Series, CSHE.6.07, June 2007),
http://cshe.berkeley.edu/publications/docs/ROPS.GEISER._SAT_6.13.07.pdf
(presenting study results showing that high-school grades are the best predictor of 
four-year college grades). 
136 See COLLEGE UNRANKED, supra note 106, at 4. 
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a. Predictive Ability of the SAT To Assess College Performance 
Critics of the central role that the SAT has come to play in college 
admissions question whether the test adds enough real-world predic-
tive value to compensate for its role in decreasing the admissions 
chances of members of lower-scoring racial, gender, and socioeco-
nomic groups.137  Specifically, they question both the outcome that the 
SAT is designed to predict—first-year college grades—and what they 
perceive to be the test’s limited ability to predict that outcome.138  The 
Educational Testing Service (ETS), the manufacturer of the SAT, re-
ports that a high-school student’s SAT score explains approximately 
thirteen percent of the variance in first-year college grades, less than 
would be explained if universities relied on high-school grades 
alone.139  SAT critics point to the ETS’s own studies as well as institu-
tion-specific studies to support their view, under the common, not 
psychometric, usage of the term “predict,” that the SAT adds little 
predictive value to admissions decisions and is a weak predictor of 
graduation rates.140
Moreover, critics believe that the SAT has limited value because it 
does a worse job than high-school grades alone in predicting grades 
beyond the first-year of college.141  This is really a subargument of the 
larger criticism that the SAT has no predictive ability to forecast what 
137 See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 115, at 974 (“It is widely recognized that high 
school grades are more predictive of college freshman-year grades than the SAT.  Per-
haps even more significant is the extremely small increase in predictiveness gained by 
using the SAT in conjunction with high school grades.”). 
138 See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Prefer-
ential Treatment:  A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 22 (1994) (examining the backlash against affirmative ac-
tion policies and arguing that affirmative action is not “preferential treatment” but in-
stead a means of providing “greater equality of opportunity in a social context marked 
by pervasive inequalities”). 
139 See REBECCA ZWICK, FAIR GAME?: THE USE OF STANDARDIZED ADMISSIONS TESTS 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION 116 tbl.5-2 (2002).  Zwick reports the results of an ETS report 
that finds an overall correlation of SAT verbal and math with college GPA of 0.36 and 
an overall correlation of HSGPA with college GPA of 0.39.  The percent of the varia-
tion in college GPA is calculated by squaring the SAT correlation of 0.36. 
140 See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 115, at 971-74 (“Indeed, empirical and statisti-
cal evidence suggests that many of those who are excluded based on test results could 
perform comparably to those admitted.”).  The incremental increase in overall correla-
tion from considering the SAT instead of relying on HSGPA alone is 0.09.  ZWICK, su-
pra note 139, 116 tbl.5-2. 
141 See, e.g., Geiser & Santelices, supra note 135, 1 (“[HSGPA] is consistently the 
best predictor not only of freshman grades in college, . . . but of four-year college 
outcomes as well.”). 
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is most important—how applicants will perform in real life.  They 
point to the success of relatively lower-scoring students as compared to 
higher-scoring ones and to anecdotal evidence that the SAT has un-
derpredicted the success of many highly successful individuals.142  The 
SAT is also often criticized for its inability to predict success “beyond 
college” as well as its demonstrated correlation to the test-taker’s so-
cioeconomic status and parents’ education.  Critics also contend that 
reliance on the SAT operates to the benefit of the children of the rich 
and well-educated.143
b. Ability of the SAT To Predict Academic Performance of Racial Minorities 
Defenders of the SAT and the ETS often respond to allegations 
that the SAT is racially biased against minority test-takers by pointing 
to studies that show that the SAT “over-predicts” the first-year grades 
of African American test-takers.144  This point can be countered by the 
fact that some institution-specific and longitudinal studies145 find that 
the SAT scores of African American students do a poor job of predict-
ing whether they will graduate from college.146  At some selective uni-
versities, African American students with lower SAT scores are more 
likely to graduate than African American students with SAT scores in 
the highest range.147  These findings question how well SAT scores 
predict African American graduation rates or the likelihood that Afri-
can American students will graduate from highly selective institutions.  
Studies have also found that for African American students with 
equivalent SAT scores, those attending more selective universities are 
more likely to graduate than African American students with the same 
SAT scores who attend less selective universities.148
142 See, e.g., John Cloud, Should SATs Matter?, TIME, Mar. 12, 2001 (reporting that 
Senator Paul Wellstone’s combined SAT score was “under 800 Combined!  Yet he went 
on to become a Phi Beta Kappa” and that Rhodes Scholar Bill Bradley had a verbal 
SAT score of 485). 
143 See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 115, at 989 (“[T]he SAT is more strongly corre-
lated with every measure of socio-economic background than is high school rank.”). 
144 SACKS, supra note 111, at 267.
145 See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 59-65 (demonstrating that the SAT is gen-
erally a poor indicator of African American graduation rates at selective schools). 
146 See Gregg Thomson, Is the SAT a “Good Predictor” of Graduation Rates?  The 
Failure of “Common Sense” and Conventional Expertise and a New Approach to the 
Question (Dec. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
147 Id.
148 Id.; BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 61. 
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C. The Relationship Between Affirmative Action and  
the Racial Gap in SAT Scores 
The persistence of racial differences in SAT scores even when se-
lecting among applicants with very strong academic credentials149 puts 
the SAT at the heart of the affirmative action debate.  A half-century 
after Conant revolutionized higher-education admissions by using the 
SAT to open higher education to those beyond the economic elite, 
critics of the SAT contend that, were it not for affirmative action, the 
test would keep the door to the nation’s most selective colleges closed 
to minority applicants.150  The net impact may be that institutions give 
less weight to the SAT in order to counteract differences in average 
SAT scores of categories of applicants—the racial, gender, and socio-
economic gaps in SAT scores.  An institution with the goal of admit-
ting students who possess demographic characteristics that coincide 
with categorical differences in SAT scores may find it necessary to 
consider those characteristics as a positive factor in admissions to 
counterbalance the impact of SAT reliance.151  In other words, group 
differences in SAT scores can influence admissions officers to give less 
weight to the SAT scores of certain applicants based on whether their 
enrollment at the institution would fulfill the institution’s need for 
particular characteristics among its student body. 152
In selecting among large pools of applicants, selective universities 
base a portion of their admissions decisions on whether a particular 
student’s admission will fulfill particular institutional goals.  An insti-
tution typically seeks to fulfill its needs for students from certain cate-
gories for each entering class.153  Decades of analysis of SAT scores 
149 See William Julius Wilson, The Role of the Environment in the Black-White Test Score 
Gap, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 112, at 434-40.  Of course, many 
individual female, African American, Latino, economically disadvantaged, and rural 
test-takers do score extremely well on the SAT and, thus, have scores higher than the 
national SAT average.  See also BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 26-31 (providing exam-
ples of minority students with exceptional SAT scores). 
150 See Strum & Guinier, supra note 115, at 992 (“[R]eliance on [existing methods] 
for determining merit screens out a disproportionate number of . . . people of color 
who apply for positions.”). 
151 A simple example of this would be the decision to consider an applicant’s ex-
traordinary talent as a poet or athlete as an admissions plus factor even if his or her 
SAT score fell below the institution’s average SAT score for entering freshmen. 
152 See generally COLLEGE UNRANKED, supra note 106. 
153 Most universities have institutional priorities that prompt them to admit ath-
letes, students with wealthy parents willing to donate large sums of money to the insti-
tution, children of alumni, students from rural as well as urban and suburban geo-
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have shown a variety of group disparities when students are separated 
based on certain categories.  Specifically, men score, on average, bet-
ter than women;154 whites and some Asian groups score better than La-
tinos and African Americans;155 the rich score better than the poor;156
and city dwellers score better than students from rural communities.157
Under the U.S. Constitution, this type of “category-conscious” de-
cision making is subject to the strictest level of judicial review if it is 
shown to be race based.  Unlike most positive admissions considera-
tions based on nonracial categories, the use of a student’s race as an 
admissions plus factor is subject to the highest degree of federal judi-
cial scrutiny.158  Before state anti–affirmative action laws, universities 
with race-conscious affirmative action policies focused on whether 
their race-based admissions practices met the Supreme Court’s appli-
cation of the federal constitutional standard of strict scrutiny. 
To date, following the passage of a new state anti–affirmative ac-
tion law, public universities in states subject to the new anti–
affirmative action laws seem to have chosen to abolish their race-based 
graphic areas, poor and middle-class students, male as well as female students, and ra-
cial minorities.  See generally id.
154 See, e.g., Sturm & Guinier, supra note 115, at 992 n.169. 
155 See, e.g., WAYNE J. CAMARA & AMY ELIZABETH SCHMIDT, C. BD. REP. NO. 99-5, 
GROUP DIFFERENCES IN STANDARDIZED TESTING AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 2 tbl.1 
(1999).
156 See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING 
RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 71 (2002). 
157 See, e.g., SAT Results:  Suburbanites Outscore City, Country Dwellers, DAILY REP.
CARD, Aug. 27, 1992. 
158 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (“Racial and 
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exact-
ing judicial examination.”).  Under strict scrutiny, a university still has the discretion to 
consider standardized admissions test scores to varying degrees depending upon the 
race of the applicant so long as it does so as part of a holistic, nonnumerical, non-
quota-based admissions process.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-37 (2003) 
(“[A] university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that 
each applicant is evaluated as an individual . . . .”).  The Court’s rationale for treating 
universities’ consideration of race differently from their consideration of nonracial 
classifications is that relying on racial classifications is inherently suspect and offensive 
to the principle of equal protection.  See id. at 333 (discussing how governments are 
constrained in how they may draw racial distinctions).  In fact, the Court has explicitly 
rejected the argument that equal protection requires institutions to adopt the race-
neutral approach to increasing racial diversity—decreasing emphasis on standardized 
tests scores for all racial groups. See Id. at 340 (rejecting the district court’s suggestion 
of decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores 
as a race-neutral means of increasing the admissions of underrepresented minorities 
because such an approach “would require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the aca-
demic quality of all admitted students, or both”). 
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affirmative action policies without leaving open the option of consid-
ering race for the purpose of avoiding potential Title VI liability to 
minorities.  As a result, the numbers of African American, Latino, and 
other underrepresented minority students admitted to these institu-
tions dwindled, and the rate of African American and Latino admis-
sions went from higher than average to lower than average.159
The key inquiry of this Article is whether state anti–affirmative ac-
tion laws permit universities to adopt race-conscious practices if reme-
dial in nature—designed to compensate for admissions disparities that 
a university suspects result from invalid use or overuse of standardized 
test scores.  For institutions with admissions statistics that reveal racial 
disparities in admissions of a magnitude that satisfies the Title VI 
standard for effect discrimination, anti–affirmative action laws could, 
in the appropriate factual circumstances, permit the use of race-based 
affirmative action.  As Part III explains in greater detail, an institution 
that has lower-than-average minority admissions rates and is unable to 
justify the degree to which it relies on SAT scores is vulnerable to 
charges that its admissions policy violates Title VI disparate impact 
regulations.  The key factual question would be whether the institu-
tion has evidence that the remedial consideration of race is necessary 
to avoid Title VI liability. 
III. ADMISSION DISPARITIES AS TITLE VI EFFECT DISCRIMINATION
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over 
the better qualified simply because of minority origins. . . . What Con-
gress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for 
the job and not the person in the abstract. 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.160
This Part explains the standard applied by federal courts to de-
termine whether a university’s admissions policies result in a Title VI 
racially discriminatory effect—a racial disparity in selection that is sub-
stantial enough to constitute evidence of discrimination.161  Using ac-
159 The number of applicants with wealthy parents and parents who attended the 
university, special talent admits, and socioeconomic and geographic diversity admits 
would likely decline in a similar fashion if the institutions relied heavily on SAT scores 
for applicants within those categories. 
160 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). 
161 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (observing that when 
expected results and actual results differ by more than two or three standard devia-
tions, the statistical disparity in selection rates constitutes evidence of a Title VI dispa-
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tual admissions data from the University of California campuses at 
Berkeley and Los Angeles and the University of Washington, this Part 
applies a “rule-of-thumb” test for identifying racially discriminatory ef-
fect—“the four-fifths rule”162—and a more sophisticated chi-square sta-
tistical test to the admissions cycles since the elimination of affirmative 
action at those institutions.  The results of this analysis reveal that the 
racial disparities in admissions to affirmative action–less public univer-
sities have on numerous occasions been of sufficient statistical signifi-
cance to make a prima facie case of Title VI disparate impact.163
Statistical evidence that a university’s admissions policy violates Ti-
tle VI’s prohibition against effect discrimination could be the basis for 
an institution’s decision to readopt race-based affirmative action.  
Universities in states with anti–affirmative action laws could reasonably 
argue that federal and state law permit remedial consideration of race 
in admissions to correct unjustified racial disparities.  Title VI federal 
antidiscrimination law explicitly requires that institutions receiving 
federal funds remedy any unjustified racially discriminatory impact 
and, as this Article explains, it is inconsistent with the antidiscrimina-
tion language and spirit of state anti–affirmative action laws for state 
courts to interpret such laws in a manner that classifies remedial race-
based admissions policies—the use of race to comply with federal 
antidiscrimination law—as a prohibited preference.164  Moreover, uni-
versities with clear statistical evidence that their admissions policies 
have a Title VI racially discriminatory effect against minorities have a 
strong basis for invoking a little-used provision of state anti–affirmative 
action laws—the federal-funding exception—on the reasoning that, as 
rate impact).  Courts have interpreted Title VI to require that the racial disparity exist 
not just within the overall applicant pool but also within the subpopulation of “quali-
fied” applicants.  In other words, there is proof of Title VI discriminatory effect if, con-
sidering only qualified applicants, the racial disparities are large enough to be statisti-
cally significant.  See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) 
(“Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may . . . constitute prima 
facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.”). 
162 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2008) (explaining the “four-fifths rule” for adverse 
impact). 
163 It may have been possible to show statistically significant racial disparities 
caused by particular admissions criteria such as the SAT prior to the elimination of 
race-based affirmative action based on the Court’s decision in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 
U.S. 440 (1982).  However, after eliminating affirmative action—a policy that amelio-
rates the statistical impact of using an admissions criterion that has a disproportion-
ately negative impact on racial minorities—statistical evidence of Title VI discrimina-
tory effect can be found through analysis of overall “bottom line” admissions 
outcomes. 
164 See infra Part IV. 
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outlined below, failure to consider race as a remedy puts their institu-
tion at risk of losing Title VI federal funds. 
A.  Rationale and Enforcement Mechanisms for the Title VI  
Effect-Discrimination Standard 
As President Johnson explained when the landmark Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was enacted, the rationale for prohibiting race discrimina-
tion in the administration of federally funded programs is simple.165
Congress provides “[f]ederal financial assistance” to support various 
public and private activities by state and local governments, private in-
stitutions, businesses, and individuals in the form of federal grants, 
loans, contracts, and other federal support.166  “Title VI rests on the 
power of Congress to fix the terms on which federal funds are made 
available”167 to prohibit entities that receive federal funds from engag-
ing in discrimination.168
U.S. Department of Education regulations promulgated to en-
force Title VI set forth the “specific discriminatory actions” that re-
cipients of federal funds must avoid.169  These regulations—often re-
ferred to as “Title VI disparate impact regulations”—state that a 
recipient of federal funds may not “utilize criteria or methods of ad-
ministration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination because of their race, color, or national origin.”170  A vio-
lation of Title VI regulations does not require proof of purposeful 
165 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 5 (“It is simple justice that all 
should share in programs financed by all, and directed by the government of all peo-
ple.”).
166 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
167 Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI:  Defending Health Care Discrimination—
It Shouldn’t Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM  L. REV. 939, 943-46 (1990).  Watson explains that 
the primary purpose of Title VI was to provide a means for dismantling racial segrega-
tion in education using Congress’s spending power, id. (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil 
Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 599 (1983)), while Congress enacted Title VII pursuant 
to its commerce power, id. (citing United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 
193, 206 n.6 (1979)). 
168 Section 601 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, provides that “[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000d.  Liability 
under Title VI itself is identical to the Federal Equal Protection Clause in its require-
ment that plaintiffs prove discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
240 (1976) (discussing cases holding that challengers have to show discrimination). 
169 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2008) (italics omitted). 
170 Id. § 100.3(b)(2). 
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discrimination.171  Thus, Title VI disparate impact regulations prohibit 
federally funded universities from using selection criteria in a manner 
that constitutes effect discrimination.172
In Alexander v. Sandoval, the Supreme Court ruled that no private 
right of action exists to enforce Title VI disparate impact regula-
tions.173  Whether rejected minority applicants may bring Title VI ef-
fect-discrimination cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—an approach en-
dorsed by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Sandoval174—has not been 
decided definitively by the Court.175  However, even if private en-
forcement of Title VI regulations is precluded, individuals are still 
permitted to file complaints with the U.S. Department of Education 
171 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-95 & n.11 (1985) (explaining 
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)).  In Guardians Ass’n v. 
Civil Service Commission, a majority of the Court held that a violation of Title VI re-
quired proof of discriminatory purpose, while a different majority held that proof of 
discriminatory effect suffices when the suit is brought to enforce regulations issued 
pursuant to Title VI.  463 U.S. at 608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (detailing the multi-
ple holdings of the Court).  Recently, in Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court assumed that 
proof of discriminatory impact was sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Title VI 
regulations.  532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001) (“[R]egulations promulgated under § 602 of 
Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial 
groups . . . .”).  See also Watson, supra note 167, at 949 (“The issue of whether Title VI 
and its implementing regulations proscribe unintentional discrimination with a dis-
proportionate adverse impact has had a tortured history in the Supreme Court.”). 
172 Some members of the Court have been critical of this interpretation.  They 
would limit the reach of Title VI regulations to intentional discrimination.  See, e.g.,
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 n.6 (discussing disparate impact regulations and § 601); see 
also Lawrence, supra note 11, at 948 n.71 (“Given the bare majority in Guardians and 
the change in composition of the Court since the holding of that case, it remains to be 
seen whether the Court will continue to defer to the [Department of Education’s] 
regulations for implementing Title VI.”). 
173 532 U.S. at 293. 
174 Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Litigants who in the future wish to enforce 
the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only reference § 1983 
to obtain relief . . . .”).  A plaintiff who sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is alleging a 
constitutional tort of sorts because officials have violated her federal civil rights.  Id.
175 The rule established by the Court in Gonzaga v. Doe presents a considerable 
hurdle to plaintiffs seeking to enforce disparate impact regulations using § 1983.  536 
U.S. 273, 287-88 (2002) (discussing only individual entitlements as being enforceable 
under § 1983).  A number of circuits have rejected Justice Stevens’s approach.  See, e.g.,
Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 629 (6th Cir. 2006) (overruling Loschiavo v. 
City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994), and relying on a combined reading of 
the Court’s decisions in Gonzaga and Sandoval to hold that a federal regulation such as 
the U.S. Housing Act cannot independently create an enforceable § 1983 right); Save 
Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that disparate 
impact regulations are unenforceable under § 1983); S. Camden Citizens v. N.J. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 
1010 (11th Cir. 1997) (same). 
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Office of Civil Rights (OCR) alleging that an institution’s admissions 
policies have a Title VI discriminatory effect on the basis of race.176
It is the responsibility of the OCR to investigate charges of discrimi-
nation filed against educational institutions.  If the OCR determines 
that a university has violated Title VI regulations, it may refer the charge 
to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  The DOJ is statutorily author-
ized to file suit against a university for failure to comply with Title VI 
regulations.  Because federal civil rights enforcement agencies have an 
independent responsibility to charge and investigate institutions sus-
pected of failing to comply with federal antidiscrimination laws, the 
DOJ and the OCR have the authority and responsibility to investigate a 
university for failing to comply with Title VI and its regulations even in 
the absence of a complaint from a rejected applicant.177
B. The Theory Underlying Title VI Racial Effect Discrimination 
The theory of discriminatory effect as a form of racial discrimina-
tion was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co.178  In Griggs, African American employees sued the Duke Power 
Company, alleging that the institution of a new high-school-diploma 
requirement and general-intelligence-test score cutoff as selection cri-
teria constituted employment discrimination.179  The Court recog-
nized that the criteria’s disproportionately negative effect on African 
American job applicants was “directly traceable to” state-sanctioned 
discrimination in educational opportunities.  The Court held that the 
176 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR THE IN-
VESTIGATION AND RESOLUTION OF COMPLAINTS ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF TITLE VI AND 
OTHER NONDISCRIMINATION STATUTES (1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ 
cor/Pubs/manuals/complain.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL
104-05 (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/vimanual.pdf; U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Educ. Opportunities Section, Frequently Asked Questions, http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/crt/edo/faq.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).  A class of “minorities and 
women qualified for graduate school admission” filed an OCR complaint accusing the 
University of California of violating Title VI and Title IX disparate impact regulations 
after eliminating race- and gender-based affirmative action pursuant to UC Regents 
Resolution SP-1.  Letter from Cal. Women’s Law Ctr., Equal Rights Advocates, Mexican 
Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, and NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., to Stefan 
Rosenzweig, Regional Director, Office of Civil Rights, Region IX, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 
(Mar. 19, 1997) (on file with author). 
177 See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2008) (detailing prohibited discrimination). 
178 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
179 The intelligence-test requirement was added on the same day that Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which required that employers cease race discrimination 
in employment, took effect.  Id. at 427. 
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educational discrimination resulted in an unjustified adverse impact 
in violation of Title VII because the power plant did not demonstrate 
that a high-school diploma and a particular intelligence-test score 
were necessary to perform the jobs in question at the power plant.180
The Court interpreted Title VII, the provision of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 applicable to employment discrimination, to prohibit employ-
ers from using facially race-neutral practices that “operate to ‘freeze’ 
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”181  Un-
der this analysis, the use of these selection criteria was illegal because 
none of the criteria was a “business necessity”—a criterion vital to as-
sessing an employee’s ability to perform the job.182
The Supreme Court’s language in Griggs is instructive in applying 
disparate impact theory to minority claims that heavy weighting of 
SAT scores as an admissions factor is not an educational necessity.  
The Court in Griggs explained that selection tests must be used in a 
valid manner—the tests must be able to accurately measure applicant 
performance: 
Nothing in [Title VII] precludes the use of testing or measuring proce-
dures; obviously they are useful.  What Congress has forbidden is giving 
these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demon-
strably a reasonable measure of job performance.  Congress has not 
commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified 
simply because of minority origins.  Far from disparaging job qualifica-
tions as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling fac-
tor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant.  What 
Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person 
for the job and not the person in the abstract.
183
To evaluate a rejected minority applicant’s claim that a university re-
lies on the SAT in a manner that constitutes Title VI effect discrimina-
tion, federal courts would employ the educational equivalent of the 
Griggs analysis. 
In order to avoid liability, a university would likely have to justify 
the use of the SAT as related to an applicant’s college performance 
ability.  Specifically, if rejected minority applicants are able to demon-
strate that the use of the SAT as an admissions criterion has a racially 
discriminatory effect, the onus is on the university either to rebut the 
statistical evidence proving discriminatory effect or to convince the 
180 Id. at 430-31. 
181 Id. at 430. 
182 Id. at 431. 
183 Id. at 436. 
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court that the use of the criterion causing the effect is an “education-
ally necessity.”184  The Court’s rationale in Griggs suggests that the es-
sence of the business necessity justification is that employers are per-
mitted to rely on a selection criterion that puts minority applicants 
disproportionately at a disadvantage if the criterion accurately meas-
ures an applicant’s ability to perform the job in question.185  Accord-
ingly, the ability of universities to defend reliance on SAT scores as an 
educational necessity will hinge upon what qualifications a high-
school student needs to attend a selective public university. 
The key factual question is whether reliance on the SAT is neces-
sary to ensure that minority applicants have the requisite college per-
formance ability to attend certain selective public universities in states 
with anti–affirmative action laws.186  Even if courts accept “admitting 
only those applicants predicted to have the highest grade point aver-
age at the end of their freshman year” as the mission of highly selec-
tive public universities—the mission that best justifies relying on the 
SAT—judges might be persuaded that the SAT has limited value in as-
sessing college performance ability when the vast majority of an insti-
tution’s applicants have stellar academic credentials.  More specifi-
cally, courts could very well be convinced by expert testimony that 
considering SAT scores as well as high-school grades does not add 
substantially to institutions’ ability to predict first-year college grades 
when compared to prediction based on high-school grades alone.187
Universities with admissions outcomes that reveal evidence of Ti-
tle VI racial effect discrimination may also run the risk that courts will 
decide that selective institutions rely on the SAT for reasons unrelated 
to assessing the college performance ability of applicants.  If rejected 
184 The exact contours of educational necessity are not perfectly clear.  Unlike the 
Title VII business necessity standard, courts have had fewer opportunities to develop 
what constitutes an educational necessity.  To rebut statistical evidence of racial effect 
discrimination, a university will need to identify the goals of its admissions policy and 
demonstrate a manifest relationship between those goals and the selection criteria re-
sulting in adverse impact.  To present objective evidence that a nexus exists between 
the admissions criterion and a particular educational goal, it will be necessary for the 
university to explicitly identify the goal(s) of its admissions policy.  See Cureton v. NCAA, 
37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 701 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (outlining the requirements of identified legiti-
mate and substantive goals), rev’d on other grounds, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999). 
185 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (allowing certain disadvantageous selection criteria if 
they are “demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance”). 
186 This inquiry subsumes the issue of how college performance ability should be 
measured.  Should it be based on freshman grades, overall college grade point aver-
age, graduation rates, postgraduation success, or some other outcome? 
187 See supra subsection II.B.2. 
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minority applicants have the requisite college performance ability, 
one could argue that highly selective universities do not need the SAT 
to weed out incompetent applicants, but instead rely on the SAT to 
fulfill their institutional desire to have a high overall SAT average in 
order to boost their prestige and bond ratings.  With the increasing 
value placed on a university’s average SAT score by students, alumni, 
professors, community stakeholders, and competing institutions 
(whose views play an important role in shaping institutional reputa-
tion), courts might conclude that a university’s contention that it uses 
SAT scores to evaluate student academic skills is a pretext for relying 
on the SAT in maintaining top-ranked status. 
An accused university could respond that the pressure to perform 
well in college rankings is itself an educational necessity that justifies 
the disparate impact of the SAT on minority applicants.  In such a cir-
cumstance, the highly ranked public university would be contending 
that it must maintain a high average SAT score to preserve its institu-
tional prestige, much like an employer for whom it is a business neces-
sity to increase profit margins.  A high ranking makes an institution 
more attractive to students, alumni, faculty, donors, investors, and en-
tities that award public and private research grants.  However, it is un-
clear whether admitting that it had a nonacademic reason for relying 
on the SAT—the SAT’s rankings- and prestige-enhancing value—
would suffice as an educational necessity that justifies using an admis-
sions criterion that has Title VI racially discriminatory effect. 
In fact, a strong counterargument to a university’s attempt to jus-
tify its reliance on the need to remain elite would be that the use of 
the SAT to maintain a high institutional average score is not tied to 
the assessment of individual academic merit.188  If the underlying 
principle of federal antidiscrimination law is to protect individuals 
from being denied opportunities based on nonmeritocratic criteria, 
universities could find it difficult to rebut the claims of rejected mi-
nority applicants that the use of the SAT is unjustified.  In fact, re-
jected minority applicants could present other admissions criteria, such 
as high-school grades, that provide very similar levels of prediction of 
188 In fact, a few universities have explicitly acknowledged that the goal of higher 
placement in college-ranking systems has created a new admissions need category—
students with stratospherically high SAT scores.  Admissions officials and universities 
admit that some of these students are admitted solely based on their SAT scores and 
that, absent the pressure on the institution to maintain a high average SAT score, 
many such students would not be selected based solely on meritocratic principles. 
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applicants’ academic potential as “less discriminatory alternatives” to 
the SAT and rebut the university’s showing of educational necessity.189
Some selective public universities, particularly those that regularly 
deny admission to hundreds and thousands of qualified applicants of 
all races,190 may have difficulty convincing courts that reliance on the 
SAT is justified by educational necessity.  In those circumstances, the 
elimination of affirmative action with continued reliance on the SAT 
could expose a university to federal liability under Title VI—even where 
the university eliminated affirmative action to comply with a state anti–
affirmative action law.  Such a university could be at risk of losing fed-
eral funding should federal agencies charged with enforcing federal 
antidiscrimination law investigate and conclude that SAT scores add so 
little predictive value over high-school grades alone that their use as a 
selection criterion has an unjustified racially discriminatory effect on 
minority applicants.  If racial disparities in admissions outcomes are of 
sufficient magnitude to constitute evidence of a Title VI racially dis-
criminatory effect, universities subject to state anti–affirmative action 
laws are vulnerable to charges that their admissions practices violate Ti-
tle VI and place them in jeopardy of losing federal funds. 
C. Proving Title VI Effect Discrimination 
The legal standard for proving Title VI discriminatory effect is 
modeled after the standard set by courts in effect-discrimination cases 
in the Title VII employment context.  The first requirement for mak-
189 Cf. Allen v. City of Chicago, 351 F.3d 306, 316 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying the Ti-
tle VII employment discrimination burden-shifting test by which the plaintiffs are “re-
quired to specify an alternative, prove that the alternative [is] equally valid and prove 
that the alternative [is] less discriminatory”).  This is particularly true if rejected mi-
nority applicants demonstrate that the use of the SAT eliminates minority applicants 
with other academic qualifications that have been predictors of success of minority ap-
plicants in the past.  See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 61 (finding that the gradua-
tion rates of African Americans in the lower SAT score bands increased with the selec-
tivity of the school that they attended); see also Robin Nicole Johnson et al., Ralph J. 
Bunche Ctr. for Afr. Am. Stud., Gaming the System:  Inflation, Privilege, and the Under-
Representation of African American Students at the University of California, BUNCHE RES.
REP., Jan. 2008, at 1, 6 (“For example, in the fall of 2007, the average high school GPA 
for entering African American freshmen was 4.08.  By comparison, entering Asian and 
white freshmen posted average GPAs of 4.33 and 4.31, respectively.  In other words, 
the typical black freshman presented a GPA that was less than three-tenths of a grade 
point lower than the one presented by the typical white or Asian freshman.” (footnote 
and citations omitted)). 
190 Cf. Atkinson, supra note 87 (“America’s overemphasis on the SAT is compro-
mising our educational system.”). 
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ing a Title VI disparate impact claim is evidence of a racially discrimi-
natory effect on minority applicants.  Effect discrimination is typically 
proven by a statistical showing of a significant racial disparity in selec-
tion rates within the qualified applicant pool.191  In the context of se-
lective higher-education admissions, Title VI effect discrimination may 
be established by presenting evidence that a federally funded educa-
tional institution utilizes an admissions criterion like the SAT in a 
manner that selects qualified minority applicants at significantly lower 
rates than nonminorities.192  While there is no single formula for de-
termining when racial disparities in admissions are so great that mi-
norities can rely upon them to prove racial discrimination,193 courts 
have referred to the four-fifths (or eighty-percent) rule endorsed by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as a rule of thumb 
for evaluating adverse impact under both Title VII and Title VI.194
Racial disparate impact under the four-fifths rule exists when the 
rate of selection of applicants of a particular race is less than eighty per-
191 See supra Section III.B. 
192 See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 593 (1983) (“Title VI 
reaches unintentional, disparate-impact discrimination . . . .”); see also, e.g., Bd. of 
Educ. of N.Y. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979) (upholding the standard of discrimi-
natory impact); Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 112 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Many cases 
have applied [disparate impact] theory to educational institutions and practices.”); 
United States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the dispa-
rate impact test for Title VI cases); Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. 
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The plaintiff first must show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that a facially neutral practice has a racially dispropor-
tionate effect.”), abrogated on other grounds, Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 
1989), rev’d on other grounds, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Larry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 
F.2d 969, 982 (9th Cir. 1984) (“A prima facie case is demonstrated by showing that the 
tests have a discriminatory impact on black schoolchildren.”).  Next, the defendant 
university is given the opportunity to rebut the evidence of discriminatory effect by 
demonstrating that the selection criterion that resulted in the admission of dispropor-
tionately fewer racial minorities is required by educational necessity.  See Larry P., 793 
F.2d at 981 n.6 (“In a Title VI case, once a prima facie case has been established the 
burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the criteria used are required by edu-
cational necessity.”).  If the defendant university successfully demonstrates that the ra-
cially disparate impact of its admissions policy is educationally justified, the institution 
is still liable for violating Title VI if the plaintiff presents a less discriminatory alterna-
tive to the challenged criterion.  See id. at 983 (refusing to find that the disparate im-
pact was caused by nondiscriminatory factors). 
193 See Harris, 444 U.S. at 151 (declining to lay out a prima facie test for disparate 
impact); Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982 (same). 
194 See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 n.4 (1982) (describing the Uniform 
Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures adopted by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission). 
1130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1075
cent (four-fifths) of the rate of selection of applicants of other races.195
A number of more sophisticated statistical analyses may also be em-
ployed to demonstrate that the racial impact of a particular selection 
criterion is sufficiently adverse to be considered prima facie evidence 
of racial discrimination.  In addition to the four-fifths rule, chi-square 
analysis, confidence-interval analysis, and probability distribution 
analysis are statistical tests used to demonstrate the adverse impact of 
selection decisions.196  Courts rely on the results of such statistical 
analyses to determine whether the success rates for racial groups dif-
fer by a statistically significant degree; if such prima facie disparate 
impact is established, discriminatory animus should be presumed and 
the burden placed on the entity making selections to demonstrate 
that its policies are not racially discriminatory.197  In other words, 
courts rely on evidence of statistical significance to determine whether 
a rebuttable presumption of race discrimination is appropriate. 
To evaluate whether reliance on the SAT in states adopting anti–
affirmative action laws creates a significant discriminatory effect within 
the meaning of Title VI, this Part applies the four-fifths test and the 
Pearson chi-square statistical test to several years of affirmative action–
less admissions at the most selective universities in California and 
Washington.  Chi-square analysis tests the likelihood that differences 
in selection outcomes are a product of chance.  Applying four-fifths 
and chi-square analysis to the post–Proposition 209 admissions cycles 
at UC Berkeley and UCLA reveals evidence of a statistically significant 
racially discriminatory impact on African American applicants for al-
most all of the admissions cycles considered.198  The exceptions appear 
to be admissions cycles at UC Berkeley during which the institution 
was a defendant in a Title VI lawsuit filed by rejected minority appli-
cants.199  The magnitude of racial disparity in UCLA admissions cycles 
when African American and Latino admissions rates were compared 
to white admissions rates was statistically significant for each of the ten 
195 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2008) (detailing the federal four-fifths standard for 
adverse impact). 
196 See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 111 (analyzing the standard deviation from the mean of 
required SAT scores in a discrimination suit brought by African American athletes 
against the NCAA). 
197 See, e.g., Harris, 444 U.S. at 151 (concluding that once disparate impact has 
been established, “the burden is on the party against whom the statistical case has been 
made” to rebut the presumption of discrimination). 
198 See infra Tables 1-4. 
199 See supra note 70. 
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years following the passage of Proposition 209.200  When limited to the 
pool of 1998 UC Berkeley applicants with very high grades, the racial 
disparity in rates of admission remained statistically significant under 
both tests.201  This analysis reveals a similar impact on Latino appli-
cants for the majority of affirmative action–less admissions cycles at 
UC Berkeley and UCLA since the passage of Proposition 209.202  There 
were several University of Washington admissions cycles for which the 
racial disparity in admissions rates comparing African Americans and 
whites as well as Latinos and whites were statistically significant under 
chi-square analysis.203  However, the racial disparity comparing Latino 
and white applicants to the University of Washington was not statisti-
cally significant under the four-fifths rule.204
1.  UC Berkeley and UCLA205
For the first affirmative action–less admissions cycle following the 
passage of Proposition 209, the 1998 cycle, UC Berkeley’s and UCLA’s 
admissions rates for African American and Latino applicants dropped 
so low compared to the admissions rate for white applicants that the 
disparity violated the four-fifths rule.  For UC Berkeley, the 33.2% 
white admissions rate compared to a 20.3% African American and 
20.8% Latino admissions rates.  Similarly, at UCLA, the 35.6% white 
admissions rate compared to 23.6% African American and 24.5% La-
tino admissions rates.  At both institutions, the African American and 
Latino selection rates were less than four-fifths the white rate—
evidence of significant racial disparity according to the four-fifths rule. 
Table 1 and Table 2 show four-fifths-rule analyses for the first ten 
years of affirmative action–less admissions cycles at UC Berkeley and 
UCLA.  The admissions cycles for which the African American or La-
tino admissions rate is less than four-fifths of the white admissions rate 
are shaded.  Based on comparisons of the African American and white 
200 See infra Table 4. 
201 See infra Tables 5-6. 
202 See infra Tables 1-6. 
203 See infra Table 8. 
204 See infra Table 7. 
205 The analysis in this section is based upon data made publicly available by the 
University of California Office of the President.  See UNIV. OF CAL. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, supra note 57.  The data for applicants with HSGPA of 4.0 and higher for 
the fall 1998 UC Berkeley admissions cycle is taken from the plaintiffs’ press materials 
(on file with author) and the First Amended Complaint, Rios v. Regents of the University 
of California, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 1999) (No. 99-0525). 
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admissions rates between 1998 and 2007, six of UC Berkeley’s post–
Proposition 209 admissions cycles resulted in racial disparities that ex-
ceed the four-fifths standard and are thus substantial.206  For the same 
period, four of the UC Berkeley admissions cycles violated the four-
fifths rule when the white and Latino admissions rates were compared. 
206 Proving unlawful race discrimination under a disparate impact theory requires 
presenting statistical evidence that the questioned policy or practice affects persons of 
a particular race or ethnicity more harshly than persons of other races or ethnic back-
grounds.  Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).  While there is 
no rigid formula for establishing disparate impact, “statistical disparities must be suffi-
ciently substantial.”  Id. at 995. 
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Table 1:  UC Berkeley Rates of Undergraduate  
Admission 1996–2007207
 White Afr. Amer. Lat./Chicano 
1998 33.2% 20.3% 20.8%
1999208 29.9% 28.2% 27.9% 
2000 30.2% 28.4% 27.5% 
2001 29.3% 24.9% 26.9% 
2002 26.9% 22.7% 24.9% 
2003 26.4% 19.3% 22.9% 
2004 28.5% 15.4% 20.5%
2005 29.4% 19.9% 23.4%
2006 24.4% 17.4% 20.3% 
2007 25.9% 16.9% 19.7%
At UCLA, the differences in African American and white admis-
sions rates were large enough to qualify as racially discriminatory im-
pact under the four-fifths rule in nine of the ten post–Proposition 209 
UCLA admissions cycles.  The Latino/white disparity in UCLA’s post–
Proposition 209 admissions rates violated the four-fifths rule in six of 
the ten undergraduate admissions cycles between 1998 and 2004. 
207 Because there are disparities in admissions rates when specific Asian subgroups 
are compared (e.g., the admissions rate for Filipinos in 1998 is 19.4% whereas the ad-
missions rate for the general category of Asian Americans is 31.8%), whites have been 
selected as the group with the highest selection rate. 
208 For the four-year period from March 1999 to March 2003, UC Berkeley’s un-
dergraduate admissions policy was the subject of a federal lawsuit alleging that the in-
stitution’s admissions policy rejected African American, Latino, and Filipino applicants 
in violation of Title VI and its disparate impact regulations.  See Consent Decree, Cas-
taneda v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 99-0525 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2003), 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9743. 
 The shaded areas in Table 1 are the rates that violate the four-fifths rule.  The 
1998 African American admissions rate of 20.3% and Latino rate of 20.8% are less than 
four-fifths of the 33.2% admissions rate of white applicants.  The 2003 admissions rate 
of 19.3% for African American applicants is also less than four-fifths of the 26.4% 2003 
white admissions rate.  Likewise, the 2004 admissions rate of 15.4% for African Ameri-
cans and 20.5% rate for Latinos, the 2005 admissions rate of 19.9% for African Ameri-
cans and 23.4% rate for Latinos, the 2006 admissions rate of 17.4% for African Ameri-
cans and the 2007 admissions rate of 16.9% for African Americans and 19.7% rate for 
Latinos are all less than four-fifths of the respective admissions rates for white appli-
cants for those admissions cycles.
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Table 2:  UCLA Rates of Undergraduate Admission 1996–2007209
  White Afr. Amer. Lat./Chicano 
1998 35.6% 23.6% 24.5%
1999 29.5% 23.9% 25.2% 
2000 31.7% 22.0% 25.2%
2001 29.0% 21.3% 23.9% 
2002 24.2% 19.2% 21.5% 
2003 24.1% 14.5% 19.7% 
2004 25.8% 12.2% 17.7%
2005 28.9% 15.8% 21.1%
2006 26.2% 11.5% 18.3%
2007 25.3% 17.1% 16.8%
Chi-square analysis of the racial differences in the same admis-
sions outcomes is even more telling.  The chi-square analysis of the 
post–Proposition 209 cycles at the same institutions shows that there is 
an exceptionally high probability of a relationship between admissions 
and race (disfavoring African Americans and Latinos) under affirma-
tive action–less admissions.  Table 3 analyzes ten admissions cycles 
starting after the enactment of Proposition 209 (1998–2007), showing, 
209 As discussed supra note 207, whites have been chosen as the group with the 
highest selection rate due to the disparities in admissions rates when specific Asian 
subgroups are compared (e.g., the admissions rate for Filipinos with HSGPAs of 4.0 or 
higher in 2002 is 16.5% whereas the admissions rate for the general category of Asian 
Americans is 29.9%).  
 The shaded areas in Table 2 are the rates that violate the four-fifths rule.  Examin-
ing the 1998 and 2000 admissions rates, African Americans were admitted at rates of 
23.6% and 22.0%, respectively, while Latinos were admitted at rates of 24.5% and 
25.2%; these figures were less than four-fifths of the white admissions rate of 35.6% 
and 31.7%.  During the three admissions cycles of 2001 to 2003, the undergraduate 
admissions rates of African Americans (21.3%, 19.2% and 14.5%) to UCLA were con-
sistently less than four-fifths of the white admissions rates (29.0%, 24.2%, and 24.1%).  
In 2004, the Latino admissions rate of 17.7% was well below the white admissions rate 
of 25.8%.  The 2004 African American admissions rate far surpassed the standard nec-
essary to constitute a violation of the traditional four-fifths rule.  That year, the admis-
sions rate for African Americans of 12.2% was less than 50% of the white admissions 
rate of 25.8%.  In 2005, the African American admissions rate of 15.8% was almost 
50% less than the white admissions rate of 28.9%, and the Latino rate of 21.1% was less 
than four-fifths the white rate.  Likewise, the 2006 African American admissions rate of 
11.5% and the Latino rate of 18.3% as well as the 2007 African American admissions 
rate of 17.1% and the Latino rate of 16.8% were all less than four-fifths of the white 
admissions rate for those years. 
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by race, the actual number of UC Berkeley applicants admitted and 
denied, rates of admission, and the number of admits and denials ex-
pected if admissions were independent of race.  The Table also pre-
sents the Pearson chi-square value ( 2) for a two-by-two contingency 
table comparing African American and Latino admissions to admis-
sions of white applicants as well as the probability of the deviation 
from expected values occurring by chance (p-value). 
By contrasting the number of admissions and denials that would be 
expected for African American and Latino applicants as compared to 
white applicants (based on their representation in the applicant pool), 
the chi-square value and its corresponding p-value explain the likeli-
hood that the racial disparities are due to chance.  It is generally ac-
cepted that p-values less than 0.05 are statistically significant.  For both 
UC Berkeley and UCLA, the p-values reflect extremely strong statistical 
significance for almost every post–Proposition 209 admissions cycle.  
Only two admissions cycles have p-values that do not rise to the level of 
statistical significance—the two cycles at UC Berkeley immediately fol-
lowing the filing of a lawsuit charging the institution with discriminat-
ing against underrepresented minorities in violation of Title VI.210
210 Thus, the period during which racial differences in UC Berkeley admissions 
rates were not statistically significant was the period during which the University was a 
defendant in a civil rights lawsuit alleging that the institution had discriminated against 
racial minorities in admissions. 
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Table 3:  Chi-square Analysis of Racial Differences in Rates  
of Undergraduate Admission at UC Berkeley211



















































































































211 The degrees of freedom (df ) = 1 for all calculations; p-value refers to the two-
tailed p-value, the probability that the variation between the actual and expected ad-
missions rates for the racial groups happened due to chance alone.  The superscripts 
indicate whether variation is statistically significant:  † denotes a p-value  0.1, indicat-
ing “marginal statistical significance;” * denotes a p-value  0.05, indicating “statistical 
significance;” ** denotes a p-value  0.01, indicating “strong statistical significance;” 
and *** denotes a p-value  0.001, indicating “very strong statistical significance.”  
Many of the p-values described as “  0.0001” in this Table are so small that there is a 
less than one chance in 1,000,000 that admissions are independent of race. 
212 As explained supra note 207, whites were chosen as the comparison group 
rather than Asian Americans because the broad category of “Asian Americans” fails to 
distinguish between Asian American ethnic groups that may or may not fall within the 
category of underrepresented minorities. 
213 For the three-year period from March 1999 to March 2003, UC Berkeley’s un-
dergraduate-admissions policy was the subject of the Rios/Castaneda federal lawsuit al-
leging that the institution’s admissions policy rejected African American, Latino, and 
Filipino applicants in violation of Title VI and its disparate impact regulations.  See First 
Amended Complaint, supra note 205. 
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Eighteen of the twenty p-values for the probability that racial dif-
ferences in admission to UC Berkeley occur by chance are statistically 
significant, with the vast majority registering p-values less than 0.0001, 
indicating a very strong degree of statistical significance. 
Table 4 analyzes ten admissions cycles at UCLA starting after the 
enactment of Proposition 209 (1998–2007), and shows the actual 
number of students admitted and denied, the rates of admission, and 
the number of admits and denials expected if admissions were inde-
pendent of race; it also presents the Pearson chi-square value for a 
two-by-two contingency table comparing African American and Latino 
admissions to admissions of white applicants, and the probability of 
the racial disparities in admissions happening by chance. 
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Table 4:  Chi-square Analysis of Racial Differences in  
tax of Undergraduate Admission at UCLA214



































































































































































































121.0  0.0001*** 
214 For an explanation of this statistical analysis, see supra note 211. 
215 As discussed supra note 207, whites were chosen as the comparison group 
rather than Asian Americans because the broad category of Asian Americans fails to 
distinguish between Asian American ethnic groups. 
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215.0  0.0001*** 
All twenty of the UCLA p-values for racial differences in admissions 
outcomes are statistically significant.  Strikingly, nine of the ten p-
values for the difference in African American and white admission 
outcomes and ten of the ten comparisons of the Latino and white 
admission outcomes are smaller than 0.0001, indicating there is virtu-
ally no chance that the racial disparities are due to “luck of the 
draw.”216
This statistical evidence that UC Berkeley and UCLA post–
Proposition 209 admissions outcomes are statistically dependent on 
the variable of race is typical of evidence relied upon by plaintiffs seek-
ing to establish a prima facie case of Title VI racial effect discrimina-
tion.217  Even when the analysis is limited to academically qualified ap-
plicants, racial disparities in admission remain sufficient in magnitude 
to constitute evidence of Title VI effect discrimination.  In other 
words, affirmative action–less admissions policies have also resulted in 
216 This type of analysis is not designed to explain why admissions and race are de-
pendent variables.  Accordingly, after a prima facie case of Title VI effect discrimina-
tion has been established, the university has the opportunity to persuade the court that 
the selection criteria resulting in racially disparate impact is “educationally necessary” 
to identify which applicants have the requisite college performance ability to attend 
the institution.  See supra text accompanying notes 184-190.  In effect, the institution 
must demonstrate that African American and Latino high-school students applying to 
their institutions are disproportionately less likely to have the requisite college per-
formance ability than white high-school applicants. 
217 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 205 at paras. 5-7. 
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lower rates of admission of African American and Latino applicants 
with the strong academic credential of HSGPA of 4.0 or higher.218
Table 5 shows that during the first year of affirmative action–less 
admission policies (1998), UC Berkeley admitted African American 
and Latino applicants with grade point averages of 4.0 and higher at 
lower rates than white and Asian American applicants with the same 
grades.  The racial disparities in admissions rates violated the four-
fifths rule.  The admissions rate of 38.5% for African American appli-
cants with HSGPAs of 4.0 and higher is less than four-fifths (79.9%) of 
the 48.2% admissions rate for white applicants with HSGPAs in the 
same range.  The admissions rate of 39.7% for Latino applicants with 
HSGPAs of 4.0 and higher is just slightly more than four-fifths 
(82.3%) of the 48.2% admissions rate for white applicants with 
HSGPAs in the 4.0-and-higher range.219
Table 5:  UC Berkeley Rates of Undergraduate Admission  
for Applicants with HSGPAs of 4.0 or Higher220
 White Afr. Amer. Lat./Chicano 
1998 48.2% 38.5% 39.7% 
218 Even if institutions like UC Berkeley and UCLA attempt to rebut statistical evi-
dence of discriminatory effect on the ground that the overall applicant pool is not the 
relevant pool for Title VI analysis, courts may be persuaded that the vast majority of the 
applicants in the African American and Latino applicant pools to selective public uni-
versities, like the overall applicant pool to selective public universities, is overwhelm-
ingly comprised of students who have the requisite college performance ability to at-
tend those public universities.  See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 10, at 30 (observing that 
competition for admission to academically selective schools increased so dramatically 
between 1976 and 1989 that “even with race-sensitive admissions, the average SAT 
score for black matriculants in 1989 was slightly higher than the average SAT score for 
all matriculants in 1951”).  In addition, like plaintiffs charging that a particular hiring 
criterion has the effect of discriminating against job applicants on the basis of gender, 
race, religion, or national origin, rejected minority applicants filing charges with the 
Office for Civil Rights might choose to present statistical analysis demonstrating that 
the use of the SAT as a selection criterion has a racially discriminatory impact on mi-
nority applicants with stellar academic credentials.  See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United 
States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (noting the relevance of statistics in Title VII cases). 
219 Chi-square analysis of this disparity is in fact “very strongly statistically signifi-
cant.” See infra Table 6, (showing a p-value of less than 0.0001). 
220 As discussed, supra note 207, whites have been selected as the group with the 
highest selection rate because of significant admissions disparities among Asian sub-
groups (e.g., the admissions rate for Filipinos with GPAs of 4.0 or higher is 31.6% 
whereas the admissions rate for the general category of Asian American is 50.6%). 
 Shaded boxes show disparities in admissions rates large enough to constitute dis-
criminatory impact under the four-fifths rule. 
2009] State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws and Title VI 1141
Table 6 shows that there was a statistically significant disparity dis-
favoring African American and Latino applicants with high school 
grade point averages of 4.0 or better in the first affirmative action–less 
UC Berkeley admissions cycle (the 1998 cycle).221  It includes the 
number of 4.0 or better students admitted and denied, the rates of 
admission, the number of admits and denials expected if admissions 
of applicants with GPAs of 4.0 or higher were not dependent on race, 
the Pearson chi-square value, and p-value. 
Table 6:  Chi-square Analysis of Racial Differences in Rates  
of Undergraduate Admission at UC Berkeley for  
Applicants with HSGPAs of 4.0 or Higher222

































24.6  0.0001*** 
Based on the p-values in Table 6, there is only a 0.4% chance that 
race was not a factor in the higher rejection rate for African American 
high-school students with 4.0 and higher HSGPAs than the rate of re-
jection of white high-school students with those grades.  The chance 
that race was not a factor in the difference in the admissions outcomes 
for Latino students with HSGPAs of 4.0 and higher and white appli-
cants with the same grades is minimal.  Like the analysis of the overall 
applicant pool, analysis of an even more qualified subset of the appli-
cant pool could be offered as prima facie evidence of a Title VI racial 
effect discrimination against African American and Latino applicants 
to UC Berkeley and UCLA after the enactment of a state anti–
affirmative action law.224
221 Only fall 1998 data for applicants with 4.0 and higher HSGPAs is publicly avail-
able.
222 See supra note 211 (explaining the statistical significance values). 
223 See supra note 207 (explaining the selection of whites, rather than Asian Ameri-
cans, as the comparison group). 
224 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 205, at paras. 3-11. 
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2.  University of Washington
In the first year of affirmative action–less admissions at the Univer-
sity of Washington (the 1999 admissions cycle), admissions rates for Af-
rican American and Latino applicants dropped lower than the admis-
sions rate for white applicants.  In that year, the admissions rate for 
white applicants was 78.9%, whereas the admissions rates for African 
American and Latino applicants were 60.9% and 72.4%, respectively.225
Table 7 shows a four-fifths rule analysis of the first nine years of post–
Initiative 200 admissions cycles at the University of Washington. 
Table 7:  University of Washington Rates of Undergraduate  
Admission 1998–2007226
  White Afr. Amer. Lat./Chicano 
1999 78.9% 60.9% 72.4% 
2000 79.9% 71.4% 73.0% 
2001 80.7% 69.1% 77.5% 
2002 70.9% 62.3% 69.1% 
2003 72.6% 59.9% 67.3% 
2004 70.2% 55.7% 67.3% 
2005 69.2% 49.8% 62.3% 
2006 71.2% 52.9% 64.7% 
2007 68.8% 51.8% 60.6% 
Five of the nine post–Initiative 200 admissions cycles violate the 
four-fifths rule for identifying racially discriminatory effect when 
comparing admissions rates of white and African American applicants.  
None of the University of Washington admissions statistics violates the 
rule when Latino admissions rates are compared to white rates, how-
ever. 
225 See University of Washington Data, supra note 60. 
226 See supra note 207 (explaining selection of whites as the group with the highest 
selection rate because of intragroup disparities within the Asian American popula-
tion—e.g., the admissions rate for Filipinos in 1998 is 19.4%, whereas the admissions 
rate for the general category of Asian Americans is 31.8%). 
 Shaded boxes show disparities in admissions rates large enough to constitute dis-
criminatory impact under the four-fifths rule.  There are no shaded Latino/Chicano 
boxes because none of the disparities in admissions rates is large enough to constitute 
discriminatory impact under the four-fifths rule. 
2009] State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws and Title VI 1143
Table 8:  Chi-square Analysis of Racial Differences in Rates of  
Undergraduate Admission at University of Washington227






























































































































































































































17.1  0.0001*** 
227 See supra note 211 (explaining the statistical analysis). 
228 See supra note 207 (explaining selection of the comparison group). 
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32.7  0.0001*** 
Several of the racial disparities in the bottom-line admissions out-
comes at the University of Washington’s post–Initiative 200 admissions 
cycles appear sufficiently large to establish Title VI racially discrimina-
tory effect against African American and Latino applicants.  However, 
the four-fifths and chi-square analyses reveal that the racial disparities 
in admissions at the University of Washington are, in several instances, 
smaller than the racial disparities at UC Berkeley and UCLA.  This is 
particularly true when the Latino admissions rate is compared to the 
white admissions rate.  University of Washington admissions outcomes 
that are neither statistically significant nor violative of the four-fifths 
rule would make it difficult for rejected minority applicants to prove 
Title VI discriminatory effect. 
Since the passage of Proposition 209, racial disparities in admis-
sion to UC Berkeley and UCLA have been consistently statistically sig-
nificant and have always disfavored African American and Latino ap-
plicants, including those with very high grade point averages.229  The 
racial disparities in admission to the University of Washington since 
the passage of Initiative 200 have also consistently disfavored African 
Americans and Latinos, but there have been some affirmative action–
less admissions cycles at the University of Washington that do not ap-
pear to constitute evidence of Title VI effect discrimination.  Having 
applied statistical tests to assess whether admissions outcomes at af-
firmative action–less universities constitute evidence of Title VI effect 
discrimination, this Part concludes that a very significant number of 
post–Proposition 209 and post–Initiative 200 admissions cycles re-
sulted in racial disparities of a large enough magnitude to jeopardize 
Title VI federal funding received by UC Berkeley, UCLA, and the 
University of Washington.  The next question to consider is whether 
public universities with evidence that their admissions outcomes con-
stitute evidence of Title VI effect discrimination may, consistently with 
state anti–affirmative action law, readopt race-based affirmative action 
as a remedial measure. 
229 See Tables 3, 4, & 6 and accompanying text. 
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IV. THE DUTY TO COMPLY WITH TITLE VI AS A REMEDIAL 
RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Congress’ intent to encourage voluntary compliance with the require-
ments of Title VI (and VII, for that matter) has always been a backdrop 
to the scheme of evidentiary burdens the federal courts have placed on 
litigants pursuant to that legislation. 
Wessmann v. Gittens
230
When affirmative action–less admissions policies result in very 
large racial disparities in admissions rates, minorities and the DOJ are 
positioned to challenge facially race-neutral admissions criteria, such 
as the SAT, under the theory that such considerations have an unjusti-
fied racially discriminatory effect.  This potential Title VI liability—the 
prospect that rejected minority applicants will file Title VI complaints 
with the OCR and that such charges could result in loss of federal 
funding—could give public universities subject to state anti–
affirmative action laws the option of articulating a corrective (reme-
dial) rationale for race-conscious admissions.  In other words, state 
anti–affirmative action law, like federal constitutional and statutory 
law, may permit institutions to use race-conscious admissions policies 
for the purpose of lessening racial disparities in admissions rates that 
constitute evidence of Title VI effect discrimination.231
It is well established that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Pro-
tection Clause permits race-based affirmative action for the purpose of 
remedying the effects of race discrimination.232  Similarly, Title VI 
regulations permit federally funded institutions “to take affirmative 
action”—a phrase that has been interpreted to mean race-conscious 
remedial measures—for the same purpose.233  If a recipient of federal 
230 160 F.3d 790, 819-20 (1st Cir. 1998) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (citing Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 336 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & 
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part)); see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 
630 n.8 (1987) (discussing the role of voluntary compliance in reaching the goals of 
Title VII). 
231 It is also important to note that if, in the future, the Supreme Court rejects the 
diversity rationale for affirmative action, the remedial rationale may be the only justifica-
tion for race-conscious admissions available to universities to justify affirmative action. 
232 See, e.g., Paganucci v. City of New York, 785 F. Supp. 467, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(“A voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plan does not violate constitutional 
standards if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  A public em-
ployer is justified in undertaking an affirmative action program if it does so to remedy 
a history of past discrimination.” (citations omitted)). 
233 The relevant Title VI regulations provide as follows: 
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financial assistance has been found to have “previously discriminated 
against persons on the grounds of race, color, or national origin,” Ti-
tle VI regulations require, as well as permit, the institution to voluntar-
ily adopt a race-based affirmative action policy. 234
The question raised by the passage of state anti–affirmative action 
laws is whether these new laws permit race-based remedial affirmative 
action.  And, if so, do state anti–affirmative action laws permit such 
corrective race consciousness to remedy the effects of disparate im-
pact discrimination?  This Part considers whether institutions may use 
race-conscious affirmative action to correct racial disparities that con-
stitute evidence of Title VI discriminatory effect, examining the spe-
cific context of admissions to selective public universities in states with 
anti–affirmative action laws. 
A.  Diversity as the Default Rationale for Affirmative  
Action in Higher-Education Admissions 
The major distinction between the remedial and diversity ration-
ales for affirmative action is the identified purpose behind the policy.  
Affirmative action policies adopted for the purpose of achieving diver-
sity in higher education may be considered “diversity justified.”235  If 
the purpose of an affirmative action policy is to correct the effects of 
(i) In administering a program regarding which the recipient has previously 
discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or national origin, 
the recipient must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior dis-
crimination. 
(ii) Even in the absence of such prior discrimination, a recipient in adminis-
tering a program may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of condi-
tions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race, 
color, or national origin. 
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(6) (2008) (emphasis added). 
234 Id.
235 In the Grutter decision and its companion case Gratz, the Court set forth the 
parameters for the diversity-justified use of affirmative action in higher-education ad-
missions, noting that policies aiming to promote diversity must still meet the narrowly 
tailored requirement.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273-75 (2003) (holding that 
the “points” system used in admissions decisions by the University of Michigan’s Col-
lege of Literature, Science, and the Arts was “not narrowly tailored to achieve [the] 
asserted compelling interest in diversity” because the plan failed to “offer applicants 
the [requisite] individualized selection process”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
334 (2003) (finding that the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions scheme 
bore “the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan” as the admissions committee consid-
ered race or ethnicity “flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in the context of individualized con-
sideration of each and every applicant”). 
2009] State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws and Title VI 1147
racial discrimination, the U.S. Supreme Court classifies the policy as 
remedial affirmative action.236  However, the diversity rationale, not the 
remedial rationale, for affirmative action has been the rationale most 
frequently invoked by universities since its conception by Justice Pow-
ell in Bakke.237
In contrast to the single-Justice opinion in Bakke supporting the 
diversity rationale, a five-Justice majority of the Court recognized the 
diversity rationale for affirmative action as constitutionally legitimate 
in Grutter.238  The Grutter-Bakke diversity rationale is a win-win for uni-
versities.  Unlike institutions adopting affirmative action pursuant to 
the remedial rationale, a university invoking diversity as its justifica-
tion for considering race in admissions is not placed in the awkward 
position of relying on evidence of its own purposeful or disparate im-
236 Professor Charles Lawrence has explained the difference between the remedial 
and diversity rationales for affirmative action: 
Arguments that focus on past and continuing discrimination against minori-
ties, women and other groups are often called “backward-looking.”  They ar-
gue for affirmative action to make amends for or to rectify the effects of past 
injustices.  By contrast, “forward-looking” arguments for affirmative action 
make sparing reference to past or current wrongdoing, and instead defend af-
firmative action as a means to some desirable future goal.  The liberal or “di-
versity” defense [for affirmative action] articulates its purpose as “forward-
looking” . . . . 
Lawrence, supra note 11, at 952-53 (footnote omitted). 
237 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978).  Justice Pow-
ell reasoned that the First Amendment afforded universities a unique academic free-
dom to create a diverse student body so long as race was one of multiple components 
of “diversity.” Id. at 312.  Universities often rely exclusively on the diversity rationale to 
defend the constitutionality of their race-based admissions policies.  See Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 334 (upholding an individualized admissions plan); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275 
(striking down a point-based admissions scheme); Smith v. Univ. of Wash., Law Sch., 
392 F.3d 367, 375-76 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding an individualized plan); Johnson v. 
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001) (striking down 
a “mechanical” plan); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
while the defendant law school invoked a remedial rationale, its arguments relied 
more heavily on the diversity rationale), vacated, 95 F.3d 53, 53 (5th Cir. 1996). 
238 More recently, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1, the Court applied the highest level of scrutiny to the consideration of race in indi-
vidual K-12 student assignments.  127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751-54 (2007).  Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion invokes diversity to justify race-conscious policies (but not race-
specific individualistic decisions) taking into account the racial composition of schools 
and neighborhoods in elementary and secondary education on grounds of the school 
board’s interest in creating a racially diverse educational environment.  Id. at 2797 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Justice Kennedy 
argues that race should be a component of diversity but that other demographic fac-
tors should be considered as well.  Id.
1148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1075
pact racial discrimination.239  Moreover, when selective universities in-
voke the diversity rationale, those institutions are rarely called upon to 
identify explicitly the characteristics that qualify or disqualify minority 
applicants.  While diversity-justified affirmative action does not elimi-
nate universities’ Title VI liability for using admissions criteria that 
have an unjustified racially discriminatory effect, it does obscure the 
discriminatory impact of the policy through “bottom-line” admissions 
decisions that seem to favor minority applicants.240  Thus, when prac-
ticed by universities prior to the passage of state anti–affirmative action 
laws, diversity-justified affirmative action may have ameliorated the ra-
cially discriminatory impact of the institution’s reliance on the SAT. 
B. Title VI Liability as a Remedial Rationale Under Federal Law 
In contrast, if the diversity rationale is unavailable to an institu-
tion—as seems to be true currently with respect to noneducational 
public entities—the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause permits the government to adopt race-conscious poli-
cies under the remedial rationale for affirmative action.  Specifically, 
the Court has held that a public institution may voluntarily adopt re-
medial affirmative action policies based on evidence that the entity’s 
selection practices violate the civil rights of minority job applicants or 
minorities seeking government contracts.  In Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena241 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,242 the Court explained 
the parameters of a public entity’s use of race-based affirmative action.  
In these cases, the Court established that a public entity may use af-
firmative action to correct for the effects of its own discrimination or 
the effects of private discrimination in which the public entity is a 
“passive participant.”243  Considered in concert with Justice 
239 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 11, at 956 (“Perhaps the University’s rejection of 
the remedial defense can be explained by its concern that by admitting its own dis-
criminatory practices it would expose itself to liability . . . .”). 
240 In order to admit a “critical mass” of underrepresented minorities—students 
from groups that make up a relatively small proportion of the student population—
diversity-justified affirmative action policies typically admit such minorities at higher-
than-average rates. 
241 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
242 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
243 Id. at 492; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (“The unhappy persistence of both 
the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups 
in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from act-
ing in response to it.”); Lawrence, supra note 11, at 955 (using the example of the Uni-
versity of Michigan’s proposed strategy in Grutter of admitting and documenting its 
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O’Connor’s analysis in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,244 the 
Court’s Adarand and Croson analysis may grant public entities the au-
thority under federal law to “facilitate a voluntary remedy” when nec-
essary to counteract the effects of discrimination.245
The Supreme Court and Congress place substantial value on vol-
untary efforts to further the objectives of federal antidiscrimination 
laws.246  In fact, the value is even greater when a public entity acts to 
remedy discrimination, “both because of the example its voluntary as-
sumption of responsibility sets and because the remediation of gov-
ernmental discrimination is of unique importance.”247  In her concur-
ring opinion in Wygant, Justice O’Connor set forth an explanation for 
permitting remedial race consciousness by public employers that 
seems equally applicable to public universities.  Justice O’Connor in-
terpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner designed to solve 
the dilemma faced by public employers with some evidence that race-
based affirmative action is necessary to avoid violating the civil rights 
of racial minorities.  She rejected the notion that such employers 
could only adopt remedial affirmative action policies if they were will-
ing to admit facts proving that the entities had, in fact, discriminated 
own historical and contemporary discrimination); Roithmayr, supra note 15, at 1498 
(positing that critical history could be used to show that the current law school admis-
sion system is structurally discriminatory and that affirmative action is necessary to 
remedy it). 
244 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).
245 Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 820 (1st Cir. 1998) (Lipez, J., dissenting).  
In his dissent, Judge Lipez applied the Adarand and Croson analysis to the selective ad-
missions context.  However, he rejected the claims of the plaintiffs and the Boston 
School Committee that, absent proof of discriminatory intent, statistical disparities in 
admissions rates to the selective Boston Latin Examination High School constituted a 
compelling justification for use of race-based affirmative action.  Id. at 817. 
246 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 290 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (arguing that it should not be necessary for public employers to prove 
their own discriminatory behavior in order to take remedial action and that forcing 
public employers to make findings of past discrimination would be contrary to the ex-
pressed desire of the Supreme Court and Congress to encourage voluntary efforts); see 
also Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark D. Rosenbaum, Promoting Equality by Protecting Local Power:  
A Neo-Federalist Challenge to State Affirmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 
140 (1999) (“Supreme Court doctrine allows the political branches of the local, state 
and federal government to adopt race-conscious measures without having to admit 
that they themselves discriminated in the past.”). 
247 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 290 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
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against minorities.248  Justice O’Connor was explicit in her observation 
that public employers should be encouraged to adopt voluntary, re-
medial, race-conscious policies to protect the civil rights of racial mi-
norities when the employer deemed such policies necessary to afford 
equal protection to minorities.249
Justice O’Connor’s rationale helps explain why the majority in 
Adarand and Croson adopted the strong-basis-in-evidence standard.  
The strong-basis-in-evidence standard permits employers to take re-
medial race-conscious action without making themselves easier targets 
for traditional discrimination lawsuits filed by rejected racial minori-
ties or “reverse discrimination” lawsuits filed by rejected whites.250
Thus, in the contracting context, the Supreme Court has established 
that the federal factual prerequisite for adopting a voluntary affirma-
tive action policy is that a government entity that opts to consider race 
in the contracting process must have evidence sufficient to create a 
“strong basis” for the conclusion that the use of race-conscious meas-
ures is needed to remedy the effects of discrimination.251  In Croson,
the Court observed that “[t]here is no doubt that ‘[w]here gross statis-
tical disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper case may consti-
tute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination’ un-
der Title VII.”252  If presented with the question, it is likely that the 
standard that the Court has articulated for assessing the federal con-
stitutionality of voluntary, remedial affirmative action in noneduca-
tional contexts would also be applied to voluntary race-based affirma-
tive action undertaken by a public university. 
Although the Court has been generally disinclined over the last 
several decades to identify government interests as sufficiently compel-
ling to justify the use of racial classifications,253 it has been willing to 
248 See id. at 291 (arguing that a public employer need not make findings of con-




251 See id. at 277 (majority opinion) (“[T]he trial court must make a factual deter-
mination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that re-
medial action was necessary.”). 
252 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977)). 
253 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-84 (finding that employer failed to establish legal 
and factual predicate for race-conscious decision making in layoffs); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314-20 (1978) (finding that the consideration of 
race in medical school admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause despite the in-
stitution’s asserted interest in diversity). 
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permit public employers to use race-conscious affirmative action poli-
cies to avoid Title VII employment discrimination liability.  The logic 
should extend to public universities seeking to avoid Title VI liability.  
Accordingly, voluntary remedial efforts to achieve such compliance 
are arguably sufficiently compelling to justify the narrowly tailored 
consideration of race.  A university seeking to use remedial affirmative 
action to insulate itself from Title VI liability and the loss of Title VI 
federal funds could invoke the Court’s analysis in Adarand and Croson.
However, in order for the Court to accept race-based admissions poli-
cies as remedial, the selective public university would have to be will-
ing to argue that the remedial consideration of race in admissions is 
not a preference for minorities but rather a corrective measure to 
avoid federal civil rights claims. 
Just as a university could argue that statistical evidence of Title VI 
effect discrimination may, in certain circumstances, be sufficient to 
justify remedial affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause, 
an institution could take the position that such evidence of Title VI 
racial effect discrimination is sufficient to demonstrate that the con-
sideration of race in admissions is not a preference under state anti–
affirmative action laws.  Using the same reasoning, the institution 
could also invoke the federal-funding exception to state anti–
affirmative action laws on the ground that race-based affirmative ac-
tion adopted for the remedial purpose of complying with Title VI fed-
eral regulations is legally permissible, even if it constitutes a racial 
preference under state law.254  This is the framework under which pub-
lic universities whose admissions cycles reveal statistically significant 
racial disparities in admissions might argue that they have the author-
ity, consistent with state anti–affirmative action law, to put the brakes 
on an unjustified freefall in minority admissions.255
254 Because it is likely that more states will adopt anti–affirmative action laws and 
because it is possible that the current Supreme Court is prepared to reject the diversity 
rationale for affirmative action, the answers to both questions are salient. 
255 As a practical matter, educational institutions may, like employers and govern-
ment entities, conduct disparity studies to justify remedial affirmative action.  After 
conducting the studies, affirmative action–less universities like UC Berkeley and UCLA 
could readopt a limited form of race-conscious admissions without running afoul of 
anti–affirmative action law.  The institutions may point to the studies as proof that the 
consideration of race does not confer a preference but instead ensures that college 
performance ability is assessed fairly and adequately. 
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C. Permissibility of Remedial Affirmative Action Under  
State Anti–Affirmative Action Laws 
Because the text of state anti–affirmative action laws leaves key 
terms like “preference” and the meaning of the federal-funding ex-
ception open to substantial and varying interpretation, state courts 
will play a central role in shaping the real-world impact of anti–
affirmative action laws.  State courts that interpret the antipreference 
provision of the state’s anti–affirmative action laws as an absolute ban 
on the use of racial classifications, are, in essence, equating the term 
preference with any race-conscious action.256  In contrast, a state court 
may conclude that prohibiting racial preferences “does not ban all 
government action that is cognizant of race.”257  This Article has identi-
fied another important legal question that state courts may eventually 
consider—whether the use of race for the remedial purpose of correct-
ing racial discrimination under the Title VI effect-discrimination theory 
violates a particular state’s anti–affirmative action law.  Again, the ana-
lytic framework for determining the state law constitutionality of re-
medial race-based affirmative action hinges upon how individual state 
courts construe the central antipreference provision258 and the fed-
eral-funding provisions permitting race-conscious action that “must be 
taken” by state government to “establish or maintain” federal fund-
ing.259
The permissibility of affirmative action to remedy purposeful dis-
crimination has already been recognized by state courts.260  Assuming 
256 See, e.g., Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 (Ct. App. 2001) (invali-
dating a state affirmative action statutory scheme applicable to the state lottery and the 
sale of government bonds based on equal protection concerns). 
257 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 72 P.3d 151, 164 
(Wash. 2003).  The California Supreme Court has come close to doing the former 
while the Washington Supreme Court’s interpretation reflects the latter approach.  See
id. at 165 (“Given th[e] language [of the I-200 voters pamphlet], an average voter 
would have understood that I-200 does not ban all affirmative action programs, and 
would only prohibit the type of affirmative action we have described as ‘reverse dis-
crimination’ or ‘stacked deck’ programs.”). 
258 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a). 
259 This is the federal-funding exception.  See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e); see 
also supra Section I.B.  State anti–affirmative action laws also include an exception for 
bona fide qualifications based on gender and for existing court orders and consent 
decrees. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(c)–(d). 
260 See, e.g., Coral Constr. Inc. v. City & County of San Fransisco, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
781, 803 (Ct. App. 2007), appeal docketed, No. S152934 (Cal. Aug. 22, 2007) (“If a city or 
other political subdivision were found to have engaged in intentional discrimination 
such that some type of race-based remedial program was necessary under the federal 
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that the Equal Protection Clause applies to remedial affirmative action 
by public universities under the standard set forth in Adarand and Cro-
son, state anti–affirmative action laws may permit remedial affirmative 
action to correct disparate impact discrimination.  Either by excluding 
remedial affirmative action from the definition of preference or by 
making the remedial use of race an exception to the general prohibi-
tion against using racial classifications, universities could urge that 
state anti–affirmative action laws be interpreted to allow race-
conscious measures when an institution needs to remedy Title VI ef-
fect discrimination.  The state courts will likely find two questions cen-
tral to this analysis:  Does considering race in admissions to correct Ti-
tle VI discriminatory effect constitute a preference under state anti–
affirmative action law?  If the remedial consideration of race does 
constitute a preference, is it a legal racial preference—made legally 
permissible by the federal-funding exception to state anti–affirmative 
action laws? 
1.  Applying the Antipreference Provision to Test Deficiency 
Assuming the Fourteenth Amendment permits institutions to use 
race-conscious admissions policies for the remedial purpose of avoid-
ing Title VI liability, in such a circumstance, remedial affirmative ac-
tion is simply “taking race into account [as] equalizing treatment.”261
Public universities seeking to readopt remedial affirmative action 
could argue that “rather than constituting a preference, affirmative 
action programs function as corrective non-discriminatory meas-
ures.”262  In fact, decades before state anti–affirmative action laws were 
conceived, Justice Powell, in his decision in Bakke, considered whether 
race-based affirmative action to counteract limitations in the predic-
tive ability of standardized tests like the SAT should be considered a 
preference.  Significantly, Powell concluded that “[t]o the extent that 
race and ethnic background were considered [in selective university 
Constitution, the supremacy clause as well as section 31 [of the California Constitution 
(Proposition 209)] dictate that federal law prevails . . . .”). 
261 Harris, supra note 46, at 711.  Harris argues that, within the context of univer-
sity admissions policies that rely on standardized tests of limited predictive ability, af-
firmative action is “a correction for the use of admissions criteria in which racial pref-
erences are embedded.”  Id.
262 Kimberle Crenshaw, Essay, Playing Race Cards:  Constructing a Pro-Active Defense of 
Affirmative Action, 16 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 196, 212 (1999).  Crenshaw argues that educa-
tional officials are incorrect to assume that they must eliminate their affirmative action 
programs following the passage of Proposition 209. 
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admissions] only to the extent of curing established inaccuracies in 
predicting academic performance, it might be argued that there is no 
‘preference’ at all.”263  Justice Powell's reasoning supports the argu-
ment that considering race to “cure” limitations in the SAT's ability to 
predict academic performance in not a racial preference. 
Correcting or remedying test deficiency—established inaccuracies 
in a test's predictive capacity—may be conceptualized in two ways un-
der state anti–affirmative action laws.  First, assuming that the primary 
interest of a selective public university is to admit the best and bright-
est high-school students based on their academic merit without regard 
to race, test deficiency unfairly undermines that goal.  Thus, admis-
sions that rely on deficient tests may actually be prohibited by the 
antidiscrimination provision of state anti–affirmative action laws.264
For instance, if a university like UC Berkeley has statistical evidence 
that its affirmative action–less admissions policies have a racially dis-
criminatory effect on African American and Latino applicants with the 
requisite college performance ability to attend the institution,265 such 
an institution may need to be race conscious in admissions to comply
with Proposition 209 and other state antidiscrimination laws as well as 
to avoid charges, investigations, and the possible loss of federal funds 
for failure to comply with federal Title VI disparate impact regulations. 
Secondly, because anti–affirmative action laws explicitly prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of race, there are strong textual and nor-
mative arguments that state courts should construe the term “prefer-
ence” to exclude the use of race to correct Title VI effect discrimina-
tion.  Interpreting the antipreference provision of state anti–
affirmative action in this manner advances both the antidiscrimina-
tion requirements of state anti–affirmative action laws and the federal 
antidiscrimination requirements embodied in laws like Title VI and its 
263 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 n.43 (1978).  In the 
context of the Bakke decision, Justice Powell’s observation had very significant implica-
tions.  Justice Powell’s opinion suggests a willingness to apply something less stringent 
than strict scrutiny to the use of race to compensate for the predictive limitations of 
standardized tests like the SAT.  Cf. Harris, supra note 46, at 710 (agreeing with Pow-
ell’s opinion in Bakke and stating that “what we call a preference depends on where we 
mark a baseline”). 
264 Professor Cheryl Harris has observed that “the consideration of race is only an 
unfair preference if the underlying system is fair and does not enact a set of prefer-
ences for particular groups.”  Harris, supra note 46, at 710; see also Crenshaw, supra 
note 262, at 212 (“Indeed, Prop. 209 explicitly prohibits discrimination, and institu-
tions are obligated to take measures to eliminate that discrimination.”). 
265 This might be true of African American and Latino applicants with HSGPAs of 
4.0 and higher.  See supra subpart III.C.1. 
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regulations.  Moreover, even state courts that construe the antiprefer-
ence provision of anti–affirmative action laws to be a per se ban on 
race-conscious state action may interpret the federal-funding excep-
tion in a manner that gives universities the legal authority to use race 
to correct for test deficiency.  In other words, state courts may inter-
pret the federal-funding exception to state anti–affirmative action laws 
in a manner that permits institutions to be race conscious to cure in-
adequacies in the SAT's capacity to make useful distinctions as to the 
relative college performance ability of racial minorities within a pool 
of highly qualified applicants. 
2.  Interpreting the Federal-Funding Exception 
The federal-funding exception to state anti–affirmative action laws 
relaxes the laws’ antipreference requirements if the state needs to be 
race conscious in order to remain eligible for federal funds.  This ex-
ception, as included in current state anti–affirmative action laws, pro-
vides explicitly that the laws “do[] not prohibit action that must be 
taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, if in-
eligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to the state.”266  On its 
face, this exception grants explicit textual permission to the state gov-
ernment to adopt racial preferences in order to establish or maintain 
federal funds.  Accordingly, public universities seeking to adopt re-
medial affirmative action could urge state courts to interpret the 
“must be taken” language as imposing a strong-basis-in-evidence stan-
dard similar to the federal standard for remedial affirmative action set 
forth by the Court in Adarand.
Courts have held that the federal-funding exception eliminates 
any potential conflict between state anti–affirmative action laws and 
Title VI because the provision makes explicit that race-based policies, 
including racial preferences, are permissible if needed to establish or 
maintain compliance with federal legal mandates.267  The rationale 
266 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(4); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400(6) (West 
2008).  The California law is worded slightly differently, without any substantive differ-
ence:  “Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which must be 
taken to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, where ineligibility 
would result in a loss of federal funds to the State.”  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(e).
267 See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 251 
(6th Cir. 2006) (“What Title VI requires, in other words, Proposal 2 expressly allows—
eliminating any conflict between the two laws.”).  Proposal 2 by its terms eliminates any 
conflict between it and federal-funding statutes like Title VI.  “This section,” the pro-
posal says, “does not prohibit action that must be taken to establish or maintain eligi-
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that federal courts have adopted is that “what Title VI requires”—
“prevent[ing] discrimination in federally assisted programs”—the an-
tipreference and federal-funding provisions of state anti–affirmative 
action laws “expressly allow[].”268
The rationale upon which federal courts have relied to conclude 
that state anti–affirmative action laws are consistent with the Four-
teenth Amendment should urge state courts to interpret anti–
affirmative action laws in a manner that best reinforces the purpose of 
Title VI.269  Permitting a public university with a strong basis in evi-
dence that it needs to use race-conscious policies in order to comply 
with a federal antidiscrimination mandate would seem to be a logical 
application of the federal-funding exception and the interpretation 
most consistent with the goals of Title VI.  A public university’s use of 
race to comply with the Title VI federal antidiscrimination mandate is 
an example of a circumstance in which a state might permissibly in-
voke the federal-funding exception. 
The purpose of the central provision of state anti–affirmative ac-
tion laws is to establish a discrimination-free equilibrium in which mi-
norities and nonminorities are treated fairly in public decision mak-
ing.  The overarching antidiscrimination purpose of anti–affirmative 
action laws supports interpreting such laws’ explicit textual exceptions 
in the manner most consistent with facilitating state compliance with 
federal antidiscrimination laws.  The purpose of the federal-funding 
exception, according to the plain meaning of its text, is to identify one 
such limited circumstance in which racial preferences remain legally 
permissible—when failure to consider race would cause a state entity 
to violate a federal mandate with which (as a recipient of federal 
funds) the state is obligated to comply.  In other words, the federal-
bility for any federal program, if ineligibility would result in a loss of federal funds to 
the state.”  MICH. CONST. art I, § 26(4).  Title VI in turn says that “[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).  
State anti–affirmative action laws have withstood federal preemption challenges to 
their constitutionality based in large part on the text of the federal-funding exception.  
The federal constitutionality of current state anti–affirmative action laws is contingent 
upon holdings by federal courts that the provisions of state anti–affirmative action laws 
do not impede a state’s ability to comply with Title VI. 
268 Granholm, 473 F.3d at 251 (quoting Title VI, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 
(1964)) (first alteration in original). 
269 See id. at 251-52 (“Proposal 2 reinforces [the] goal [of Title VI] by prohibiting
state universities from discriminating, or granting preferential treatment, on the basis 
of race.”) 
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funding exception to state anti–affirmative action laws operates as a 
safety valve that protects states that are subject to anti–affirmative ac-
tion laws from losing federal funds for noncompliance with federal 
civil rights laws like Title VI. 
Professor Eugene Volokh has suggested a much different inter-
pretation of the “must be taken” language of the federal-funding ex-
ception—that the exception only applies if the state demonstrates that 
eligibility for the federal program is “genuinely necessary” because no 
race-neutral action would preserve federal funding.270  Specifically, Vo-
lokh’s view is that 
[t]he discriminatory conduct thus must be genuinely necessary for eligi-
bility—it’s not enough that it be potentially helpful, or generally consis-
tent with the spirit of the federal program.  If it’s possible to be eligible 
without the discrimination, then the discrimination is prohibited, be-
cause it’s not true that the action “must be taken” for eligibility.  Like-
wise, if the state can switch to a nondiscriminatory program that will still 
provide the federal funds, then the discriminatory conduct remains im-
permissible.  In such a case, ineligibility for the discriminatory program 
would not result in a loss of federal money.
271
State courts should reject this interpretation of the federal-funding 
exception—that public entities must demonstrate that no race-neutral 
action would satisfy the federal requirement.  The primary reason that 
Professor Volokh’s interpretation of the federal-funding exception 
should be rejected is that the text of the exception, if so interpreted, 
would have no practical effect.  If state courts were to adopt Professor 
Volokh’s interpretation of the federal-funding exception, it is likely 
that no public entity would be able to invoke the provision.  If the 
federal-funding exception is interpreted to require that public univer-
270 See Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative:  An Interpretive Guide, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1387 (1997).  Professor Volokh did not consider any specific fed-
eral programs in interpreting the federal-funding exception: 
I don’t know how many federal programs really require race or sex discrimi-
nation; the clause wasn’t added with any particular program in mind.  It was 
simply meant to foreclose any possible campaign argument that “[t]he CCRI 
would cost California voters $X million in federal money,” based on some 
program that opponents might have unearthed. 
Id. (italics added) (alteration in original); see also Stephen R. McCutcheon, Jr. & Travis 
J. Lindsey, The Last Refuge of Official Discrimination:  The Federal Funding Exception to Cali-
fornia’s Proposition 209, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 457, 458 (2004) (“[T]he proper inter-
pretation of [the federal-funding] exception will be the most heated battleground over 
the initiative’s enforcement.”). 
271 Volokh, supra note 270, at 1387. 
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sities demonstrate that it is literally impossible to conceive of a race-
neutral means of complying with Title VI federal law, the provision 
becomes superfluous.  Moreover, such an interpretation would make 
the exception inherently illogical.  Like the other textual exceptions 
set forth in state anti–affirmative action laws,272 the federal-funding ex-
ception makes legal what would otherwise constitute a “preference” 
under the central antipreference provision of the law. 
V. RESPONSIBILITY FOR RACIAL DISPARITY
Setting forth the analytic framework by which universities may re-
adopt a remedial form of affirmative action is important because it 
differentiates the legal constraints imposed on public universities by 
state anti–affirmative action laws from the powerful, but nonlegal, 
forces that “normalize” significantly lower minority admissions rates.  
This Article makes it clear that admitting African American and La-
tino applicants at significantly lower rates than applicants of other 
races is not mandated by state anti–affirmative action laws.  The Arti-
cle also identifies a circumstance when race-based affirmative action 
may be permissible subsequent to the passage of a state anti–
affirmative action law—when a public university can viably argue that 
a race-based admissions policy is adopted for the purpose of remedy-
ing Title VI discriminatory effect. 
An affirmative action policy adopted to limit Title VI liability to 
minorities would no doubt differ in degree from a diversity-justified 
affirmative action policy.  The scope of a remedial race-based affirma-
tive action policy would be necessarily limited to race-consciousness 
that would eliminate unjustified disparities in admissions rates that 
federal courts deem evidence of a Title VI disparate impact violation 
against qualified African American and Latino applicants.  This rea-
soning does not apply to race-conscious action taken to achieve the 
broader goal of racial diversity in higher education. 
The empirical research in this Article establishes that racial dis-
parities in admissions rates subsequent to the passage of state anti–
affirmative action laws have, in many instances, been of sufficient 
magnitude to expose affirmative action–less universities to potential 
Title VI liability.  Institutions with a strong basis in evidence that their 
reliance on the SAT would be difficult to justify as educationally nec-
essary may be able to adopt a remedial affirmative action policy with-
272 See supra note 48. 
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out violating state anti–affirmative action law.  Specifically, universities 
could justify the explicit consideration of race in admissions as a non-
preferential corrective use of race or as a legally permissible racial 
preference under the federal-funding exception. 
Thus, it may be that, before and after the passage of a state anti–
affirmative action laws, institutions retain the option to justify or to 
remedy racial disparities in admissions that constitute a Title VI dis-
criminatory effect.  A university’s own normative assessment of 
whether the racial gap in SAT scores is a product of minority defi-
ciency or test deficiency will likely be the determinant factor in 
whether state courts find a particular race-conscious policy remedial 
and legally permissible.  The analysis in this Article explains why insti-
tutions in states with anti–affirmative action laws retain the discretion 
to evaluate their compliance with federal civil rights laws such as Title 
VI.  In so doing, universities may assess whether racial disparities in 
admissions are the product of minority deficiency—deficiencies in the 
college performance ability of certain racial groups—or the product 
of test deficiency—limitations in the predictive capacity of a particular 
admissions criterion such as the SAT.  Thus, a selective public univer-
sity’s view of the college performance ability of its state’s most quali-
fied African American and Latino applicants will, in effect, determine 
the permissibility of remedial race-based affirmative action under state 
anti–affirmative action law. 
CONCLUSION
In response to low African American admissions rates, one UCLA 
professor asked the provocative question whether the number of new 
African American students attending his institution had “to get to zero 
before we become outraged.”273  When admissions of African Ameri-
cans later increased, a different UCLA professor made headlines when 
he relied on that increase to support his charge that “UCLA is cheat-
ing on admissions.”274  By considering whether an extremely low ad-
missions rate for certain racial groups justifies the use of race-based 
273 Franklin D. Gilliam Jr., Pride and Shame at the School of a Black Hero, L.A. TIMES,
May 22, 2004, at B19.  Gilliam wondered, in light of the steady post–Proposition 209 
decline in the number of African American—and particularly African American 
male—students, “How long will it be before [a bust of deceased UCLA alumnus] Ralph 
Bunche is the last black person at UCLA?”  Id.
274 TIM GROSECLOSE, REPORT ON SUSPECTED MALFEASANCE IN UCLA ADMISSIONS 
AND THE ACCOMPANYING COVER-UP 1 (2008). 
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affirmative action for the remedial purpose of avoiding Title VI liabil-
ity, this Article provides an empirical and legal framework for evaluat-
ing which professor’s outrage is justified. 
Affirmative action–less admissions policies adopted by several se-
lective public universities to comply with anti–affirmative action laws 
have resulted in racial disparities in admissions rates that could, if not 
justified by “educational necessity,” satisfy the federal standard for a 
prima facie case of Title VI disparate impact.  This Article sets forth 
the legal framework for evaluating a university’s assertion that its race-
based affirmative action may not violate state anti–affirmative action 
laws if the race-consciousness is remedial in nature.  The Article also 
asserts the normative claim that state anti–affirmative action laws 
should be interpreted in the manner most likely to ensure that the 
state’s most prestigious higher-education opportunities are fairly and 
equally available to the state’s most qualified students of all races.  
Viewing race-based affirmative action as a river of educational oppor-
tunity through which minority students gain access to premier public 
universities, this Article demonstrates that state anti–affirmative action 
laws need not necessarily act as dams.  For universities that deem mi-
nority applicants sufficiently qualified, these laws may leave an open 
channel to use race-conscious policies to remedy potential violations 
of Title VI federal antidiscrimination law. 
